Some species and individuals are able to learn cognitive skills more flexibly than others. Learning experiences and cortical function are known to contribute to such differences, but the specific factors that determine an organism's intellectual capacities remain unclear. Here, an integrative framework is presented suggesting that variability in cognitive plasticity reflects neural constraints on the precision and extent of an organism's stimulus representations. Specifically, it is hypothesized that cognitive plasticity depends on the number and diversity of cortical modules that an organism has available as well as the brain's capacity to flexibly reconfigure and customize networks of these modules. The author relates this framework to past proposals on the neural mechanisms of intelligence, including (a) the relationship between brain size and intellectual capacity; (b) the role of prefrontal cortex in cognitive control and the maintenance of stimulus representations; and (c) the impact of neural plasticity and efficiency on the acquisition and performance of cognitive skills. The proposed framework provides a unified account of variability in cognitive plasticity as a function of species, age, and individual, and it makes specific predictions about how manipulations of cortical structure and function will impact intellectual capacity.
Intellectual capacity varies as a function of species, age, and individual (see, e.g., Binet & Simon, 1905 /1961 Neisser et al., 1996; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003; Spearman, 1904; Thorndike, 1911) . Behaviorally, this variability is evidenced by differences in the capacity to learn a cognitive skill, the rate at which the skill is learned, and the highest performance levels that can be achieved (Ackerman & Cianciolo, 2000; Harlow, 1959; Li et al., 2004) . For example, prodigies may rapidly acquire the ability to compute mathematical functions, compose music, or play chess at levels exceeding those of most other individuals (D. H. Feldman, 1993) . Dolphins can rapidly learn to classify any pair of objects as being either the same or different (Mercado, Killebrew, Pack, Macha, & Herman, 2000) , whereas pigeons have difficulty learning this task (Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Katz & Wright, 2006) , suggesting that these two species differ in their capacity to acquire this particular cognitive skill. Why do some individuals or species rapidly learn a cognitive skill when others do not? This fundamental unanswered question lies at the heart of understanding intellectual capacity.
The answer to this question undoubtedly relates to brain function, but the specific mechanisms through which neural circuits facilitate and constrain intellectual abilities remain poorly understood. Past efforts to correlate variability in behavioral flexibility and intelligence with brain structure and function point to at least three neural properties that may limit intellectual capacity: (a) the absolute or relative size of one or more brain regions (Abboitz, 1996; Gibson, 2002; Healy & Rowe, 2007; Jerison, 1973 Jerison, , 2002 Roth & Dicke, 2005) ; (b) the capacity of neural circuits (especially in the frontal lobes) to actively maintain and control information processing (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; J. Duncan, 2001; Gray & Thompson, 2004; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Petrides, 1996) ; and (c) the capacity of neural circuits to physically change their connections over time to maximize efficiency (Garlick, 2002 (Garlick, , 2003 Hebb, 1949; Li, 2003; Li, Brehmer, Shing, Werkle-Bergner, & Lindenberger, 2006; Pascual-Leone, Amedi, Fregni, & Merabet, 2005; Stiles, 2000) . Put simply, compact neural circuits may afford less processing power than can more extensive circuits; less memory capacity may reduce the range of operations that neural circuits can perform; and hard-wired circuits may be less efficient than adaptable circuits.
In the present article, I attempt to provide an integrative, brainbased framework for investigating and understanding variability in cognitive plasticity in humans and other animals by building on classic theories of learning and intelligence. The brain's capacity to differentiate representations is specified as the primary determinant of which cognitive skills an organism can learn as well as how long it will take for an organism to learn a particular cognitive skill. The framework then links this capacity to basic structural and functional properties of cortical networks, 1 identifying three factors that potentially can account for variability in intellectual capacity within and across species. Each of these factors is affected 1 The emphasis on cortical function in this article should not be interpreted as suggesting that animals without cerebral cortex (e.g., birds) are incapable of learning cognitive skills. The current review focuses on cortical processing in mammals because more data are available regarding their cognitive capacities and neural function. Neural circuits that serve analogous functions to cortex may also constrain intellectual capacity in non-mammalian species.
by both genetic and environmental variables (including the accumulation of knowledge), and each can in principle be experimentally manipulated to determine its impact on an organism's intellectual capacity. The proposed explanatory framework incorporates processes of evolution, development, and individual learning and synthesizes findings from the fields of comparative cognition, human intelligence, and systems neuroscience. The framework accounts for known correlations between neuroanatomy and measures of intelligence and also predicts additional correlations that have not been considered in past studies. Additionally, the framework makes several novel predictions about the impacts of various experimental manipulations of brain structure and function on the acquisition of cognitive skills.
The main aim of the article is to provide a broad empirical and theoretical framework from which specific testable hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying intellectual capacity can be formulated. The broad scope of this review precludes comprehensive consideration and synthesis of all the relevant literature. Instead, I review an assortment of classic and modern empirical findings that are either representative of a particular research direction or that are particularly pertinent to evaluating the proposed framework. I provide references to more extensive, specialized reviews throughout the article in an attempt to supplement necessarily abbreviated discussions of topics about which volumes have been written.
Cognitive Plasticity and Related Constructs
Researchers often use the term cognitive plasticity in discussions of cognitive development during early childhood and cognitive vitality in old age to refer to the modifiability of cognition by social interactions and training experiences (Kramer, Bherer, Colcombe, Dong, & Greenough, 2004; Li, 2003) . In the present context, I develop a broader conception of this psychological construct that encompasses a wider range of learning experiences and intelligence measures and that generalizes across species.
Many organisms can adapt their behavior on the basis of experience. William James (1890) described the capacity that enables humans to form "new sets of habits" or skills as plasticity. Skill learning can be classified into two types: perceptual-motor and cognitive (Anderson, 1982; Fitts, 1964; Johnson-Laird, 1982; Rosenbaum, Carlson, & Gilmore, 2001) . Whereas perceptualmotor skill learning requires adjusting motor responses on the basis of sensory feedback, cognitive skill learning involves acquiring the ability to solve a problem in a way that was not previously possible, without necessarily requiring any new perceptual-motor skills (Rosenbaum et al., 2001; VanLehn, 1996) . Cognitive skills can thus be defined as abilities that an organism can improve through practice or observational learning and that involve judgments or processing beyond what is involved in learning or performing a perceptual-motor skill. For example, learning to solve the Tower of Hanoi puzzle is challenging not because it requires learning to place disks on pegs (a perceptual-motor skill) but because it requires the discovery of effective strategies for moving disks to achieve a particular outcome (a cognitive skill). Following the terminology of James, the capacity to acquire cognitive skills can be described as cognitive plasticity. Cognitive plasticity enables individuals to learn to solve problems in intellectual taskssuccess is determined by the appropriate application of knowledge rather than dexterity. This construct can be operationalized as the rate and proficiency of cognitive skill learning (Figure 1 ).
Humans and other animals differ in their ability to acquire cognitive skills and to generalize them to novel contexts. Historically, such differences have been attributed to variability in intelligence. Binet and Simon (1905/1961, p. 93 ) defined intelligence as the "faculty of adapting one's self to circumstances," and some researchers view the ability to flexibly solve problems as synonymous with intelligence (Hofman, 2003; Macphail, 1982) . If intelligence is viewed as a general capacity to acquire and apply knowledge (Jensen, 1989) , then intelligent behavior is little more than a demonstration of cognitive skills (Eysenck, 1982) , and cognitive plasticity is conceptually equivalent to intelligence. Most modern conceptions of intelligence are derived from an individual's performance on psychometric tests, however (for a review, see Neisser et al., 1996) , and most of these tests only indirectly measure cognitive skill learning (e.g., focusing on how problemsolving skills are applied rather than on how they are acquired). Consequently, in the following discussion, the term intelligence is used to describe an individual's ability to perform cognitive skills, as indicated by scores on behavioral tests.
One recently proposed mechanism for differences in human intelligence (and by proxy cognitive plasticity) is neural plasticity (Garlick, 2002) . Neural plasticity refers to the capacity of neural circuits to change in response to fluctuations in neural or glial activity. This phenomenon is typically associated with changes in synaptic connections between individual neurons but also includes processes such as the addition of new neurons (neurogenesis), increased myelination of axons, or changes in the size or shape of a neuron. In a recent review discussing cortical plasticity in the human brain, Pascual-Leone and colleagues (2005) argued that "plasticity is an intrinsic property of the nervous system retained throughout a lifespan" and that "it is not possible to understand normal psychological function or the manifestations or consequences of disease without invoking the concept of brain plasticity" (p. 378). Accordingly, Garlick (2002 Garlick ( , 2003 proposed that if brains vary in the ability to adjust neural connections based on Figure 1 . Idealized cognitive skill acquisition curves for individuals varying in cognitive plasticity. High cognitive plasticity is associated with rapid learning and high performance levels. These three curves could reflect learning by different species, by different individuals varying in intelligence, or by an individual at different points in his or her lifespan. Dotted line ϭ low plasticity; dashed line ϭ moderate plasticity; solid line ϭ high plasticity.
experience, then those individuals with higher levels of neural plasticity might have greater intellectual capacity. Other researchers have suggested that genetic factors impacting neural efficiency or plasticity in the lateral prefrontal cortex determine individual differences in intelligence (Gray & Thompson, 2004; Shaw et al., 2006) .
The framework presented below similarly assumes that neural plasticity contributes to cognitive plasticity and intelligence but only to the extent that reorganization increases the brain's capacity to resolve stimulus representations. The term stimulus representation is used here to refer to neural activity evoked either by sensory receptors or by the initiation of movements and thoughts. Stimulus representations indicate that particular environmental and internal states have occurred (or are about to occur), and they thus represent those states. The present framework proposes that an organism's representational resolving power constrains what that organism can learn about events. In particular, an individual that cannot distinguish two stimulus representations cannot learn to respond differentially to the events that are associated with those representations. Consequently, an organism's cognitive plasticity is limited by the capacity of its brain to resolve stimulus representations, hereafter referred to as representational resolution. Furthermore, the current framework proposes that individual differences in cognitive plasticity arise because representational resolution varies across individuals and as a function of age.
Like many prior attempts to account for intellectual capacity, the present framework assumes that cortical networks are critical. Rather than focusing on increases in computational power or executive control functions afforded by cortical expansion, however, the current framework emphasizes a basic building block of cortical circuits: cortical modules. The term cortical module is used in neuroscience to describe anatomical and electrophysiological regularities in cortical circuits (Leise, 1990; Mountcastle, 1998; Zaborszky, 2002) . Specifically, iteratively repeated networks of cortical neurons appear to contain compact circuits that can function independently or together; the term cortical module, as used in this article, refers to one of these compact circuits. Because cortical modules are structural in nature (and therefore observable), they do not correspond to the functionally specialized "mental modules" proposed by Fodor (1983) . Although there is a not a specific neural computation or function that all cortical modules are known to perform, there are abundant data showing that cortical neurons in at least some modules respond selectively to sensory inputs and that in several cortical regions the spatial organization of cortical modules reflects stimulus selectivity (see Mountcastle, 1998 , for a review). These data suggest that some cortical modules facilitate the differentiation of sensory events. The present framework extends this idea to suggest that, in general, cortical modules facilitate the differentiation of stimulus representations. Given that the framework also proposes that cognitive plasticity depends on representational resolution, variability in cortical modules that occurs as a function of an individual's species, age, or heredity should be associated with variability in that individual's cognitive plasticity and intelligence.
The framework identifies three factors that likely determine the impact of cortical modules on representational resolution: their availability, reconfigurability, and customizability. Availability refers to the number and diversity of cortical modules that are available for differentiating stimulus representations. This factor, which is closely related to the complexity of cortical circuits, constrains the range of possible stimulus representations in ways that are analogous to how pixel density and color depth limit the crispness and precision of images displayed on a computer monitor. Reconfigurability refers to the brain's ability to flexibly develop new configurations of cortical modules, and to rapidly switch between them, as a function of task demands. This factor impacts the functional versatility of neural circuits; for example, different subsets of available cortical modules may be engaged during different stages of learning. Customizability refers to the brain's capacity to dynamically adjust the selectivity of cortical modules based on experience. This factor captures the effects that neural plasticity mechanisms may have on the number and diversity of cortical modules. These three factors are interdependent because the range of circuit configurations depends on the number and specificity of modules, and reconfiguring or customizing cortical modules can affect their availability.
Theoretical Precursors to the Framework
The present framework builds on several classical theories of the mechanisms underlying learning and intelligence: Harlow's (1949 Harlow's ( , 1959 theory of learning sets; Spearman's (1904) theory of general intelligence and general discrimination, and Hebb's (1949 Hebb's ( , 1980 theory of cell assemblies. These theories have greatly influenced modern ideas about the mechanisms of intellectual capacity as well as the impact of experience on these mechanisms. By current standards, the theories might appear overly simplistic and inadequate to deal with the mass of data that has been collected by neuroscientists, intelligence researchers, and cognitive psychologists over the last 50 years. Nevertheless, the theories identify key principles that can still provide important insights into the factors that constrain an organism's intellectual abilities. Harlow's (1949) discovery that monkeys trained on series of novel visual discrimination problems got progressively better at solving new problems challenged Thorndike's (1911) claims that animals learned only through trial and error. After extensive experience learning to select one image of a pair for many different pairs, monkeys eventually were able to determine which of the two images would be rewarded after performing a single trial with a new pair; that is, if they initially chose the correct image on the first trial, they would continue to choose it in subsequent trialsotherwise, they would choose the alternative. Harlow (1949) described this process as "learning to learn," or forming a learning set. Harlow's (1949) findings suggested that monkeys were not limited to learning about the particulars of the world but that they could also figure out general strategies for solving problems. Furthermore, cross-species correlations between performance on learning set tasks and behavioral flexibility seemed to indicate that measures of learning set formation could provide an objective test of animal intelligence (Harlow, 1959) .
Harlow's Learning Set Theory
Following Harlow's (1959) lead, comparative psychologists began to use cognitive plasticity (operationally defined as rate of acquisition and asymptotic performance on learning sets) as a measure of animal intelligence (e.g., Doty, Jones, & Doty, 1967; Schrier, 1966) . Specifically, the species that developed learning sets the fastest and to the highest levels of performance were considered to be the most intelligent. The objectivity of these behavioral measures also made it possible to correlate them with various measures of brain volume. For example, Riddell and Corl (1977) compared rankings of different species derived from several brain metrics with rankings based on learning set performance. They reported a near-perfect correlation (r ϭ .87-.98), suggesting that brain metrics provide the best possible predictor of differences in intellectual capacity across species.
Critics were quick to note, however, that both the brain metrics and the learning set performance measures used in such analyses involved simplistic assumptions that did not always fit the known facts (Macphail, 1982) . For instance, rankings based on either relative brain size or learning set performance have resulted in some non-primates being ranked higher than some monkeys. Additionally, measures of learning set formation have not provided an unequivocal indication of intelligence because differences in performance may reflect differences in sensory, motor, or motivational factors rather than differences in problem-solving abilities (Bitterman, 1965 (Bitterman, , 1975 Hodos & Campbell, 1969; Lefebvre, 1996; Macphail, 1982; Slotnick, Hanford, & Hodos, 2000; Thomas, 1996) . For example, bottlenose dolphins initially showed little ability to form learning sets for an auditory discrimination task (Herman, Beach, Pepper, & Stalling, 1969) , but minor procedural changes later revealed learning capacities comparable with those of primates (Herman & Arbeit, 1973) . Such interpretational complications ultimately squelched attempts to rank different species in terms of their intelligence on the basis of measures of learning set performance and decreased interest in learning set formation.
Traditional learning set tasks are clearly limited as cross-species intelligence metrics. Nevertheless, learning set studies still can provide important clues about how cognitive plasticity varies within and across species (Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971) . To develop a learning set, an organism must adjust how it approaches solving a problem. For instance, Harlow (1959) described learning across a series of visual discrimination tasks as involving a gradual shift from an initial period of trial and error learning to a phase of insight learning in which the learner adopts a generalized rule: win-stay, lose-shift. From this perspective, learning to learn might be more accurately described as learning to recognize, because what an individual ultimately learns is when to apply certain strategies. Most explicit studies of learning set formation have involved series of discrimination tasks like those used by Harlow, but there are many other experiments in which animals have learned general strategies for solving problems (see Roitblat & von Fersen, 1992 , for a review). For example, animals have learned to classify objects as same or different (Premack, 1983a) , to assign numerals to quantities (Brannon & Terrace, 1998) , and to repeat actions on command (Mercado, Murray, Uyeyama, Pack, & Herman, 1998) . Cognitive skill learning tasks such as these which require animals to learn "abstract" rules likely involve learning set formation. The future development of more sophisticated learning set tasks may help to overcome the limitations associated with classical approaches in the same way that development of human intelligence tests has improved their utility.
The idea that learning set formation may be relevant to a wide range of learning phenomena in humans and other animals (initially proposed by Harlow, 1959) has resurfaced in theories of human learning and problem solving. For example, Halford and colleagues (Halford, Bain, Maybery, & Andrews, 1998) proposed that learning set acquisition often involves forming a representation of task structure and mapping that structure onto novel problems (much like analogical inference). From this perspective, learning sets are types of general knowledge abstracted from personal experiences that guide choices and actions. In this more general framework, learning set formation involves recognizing the constraints and relevant dimensions of a problem space, identifying the relevant options for responding within that problem space, and acquiring the skills (cognitive and perceptual-motor) necessary to achieve a satisfactory outcome (Adolph, 2002) . Harlow (1959) proposed that insightful learning and performance, as well as all concepts, develop only through the formation of learning sets. He showed experimentally that the capacity of monkeys and children to form learning sets increased systematically as a function of their age, that their acquisition rate was correlated with asymptotic performance levels (as in Figure 1 ), and that similar variability in acquisition patterns was apparent across primate species (Harlow, 1949; 1959) . He also showed that braininjured monkeys that were missing cortex from one hemisphere acquired learning sets like normal monkeys, but with an accuracy that was consistently lower than normal (Harlow, 1949) . These data led him to conclude that there is a capacity factor or factors which influence speed of learning set formation, asymptote of maximally efficient learning set performance, and even the ability to form effective learning sets. The factor or factors may also determine the minimal number of trials per problem essential to establish the learning set, and probably determine the maximal complexity of problems amenable to learning set formation. (Harlow, 1959, p. 508) He attributed this capacity factor or factors to cortical complexity.
Spearman's Theory of General Intelligence and General Discrimination
Intelligence has long been associated with the ability to perform well in school. Spearman (1904) showed that different assessments of academic performance share a common source of variance, which he described as general intelligence (also referred to as g; Neisser et al., 1996) . He also reported that measures of general intelligence were highly correlated with measures of general discrimination capacities, substantiating Galton's (1883) earlier claims of a correspondence between intellectual capacity and sensitivity to fine sensory differences. Galton suggested that acuity was the source of intellectual capacity because "the more perceptive the senses are of difference, the larger is the field upon which our judgment and intelligence can act" (Galton, 1883, p. 19) . In contrast, Spearman attributed this correspondence to a common underlying cause, which he described as the "Intellectual Function."
Other studies during this same period, however, refuted the idea that perceptual acuity was related to intelligence (e.g., Wissler, 1901 ; for a review, see Deary, 1994) . Furthermore, researchers were quick to note cases such as Helen Keller, in which keen intellect developed despite severely impaired sensory capacities. As a result, interest in the relationship between perceptual acuity and intelligence quickly waned.
A century later, confirmations of Spearman's (1904) reports regarding a link between intelligence and discrimination abilities have begun to appear, and Wissler's (1901) results have come under increasing scrutiny (Deary, 1994) . These recent studies have suggested that constraints on intellectual capacities directly parallel, or are identical to, constraints on sensorimotor processes (Deary, 1995; Deary, Bell, Bell, Campbell, & Fazal, 2004; Helmbold, Troche, & Rammsayer, 2006; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994; Lindenberger, Scherer, & Baltes, 2001; Raz, Willerman, & Yama, 1987; Rosenbaum et al., 2001; Watson, 1991) . For example, Deary and colleagues (2004) statistically compared several measures of general intelligence with measures of sensitivity to differences in color and loudness and found that a general intelligence factor shared 85% of its variance with a general discrimination factor, replicating Spearman's results.
Unlike Harlow (1949 Harlow ( , 1959 , Spearman viewed the effects of learning on intellectual performance as an "irrelevancy" that had to be eliminated to identify an individual's "natural innate faculties" (Spearman, 1904, p. 227) . In part, Spearman adopted this approach because if (as stated by many persons on the strength apparently of a priori reasoning) we had assumed that the discrimination of minute differences of sensation 'is to be cultivated as the foundation of all intelligence,' then we should have had to admit the variations due to Practice as perfectly relevant and we should have looked for a continual expansion in people's general ability in proportion to the labor they had expended on distinguishing tones, shades, and weights from one another. (Spearman, 1904, p. 228) In short, Spearman was interested in measuring individual differences in intellectual talent, whereas Harlow was interested in measuring how organisms acquire cognitive expertise. Despite these different perspectives, both men arrived at the same conclusion: Some fundamental underlying factor constrains an individual's intellectual capacity. Hebb (1949) effectively synthesized the views of Harlow (1949 Harlow ( , 1959 and Spearman (1904) by proposing that the term intelligence has two different meanings. Hebb (1949) described "Intelligence A" as referring to an individual's innate potential and "Intelligence B" as referring to a person's intellectual performance. From Hebb's (1949) perspective, both Harlow (1949) and Spearman were using tests of Intelligence B to make inferences about Intelligence A. The main question that Hebb (1949) was interested in answering, however, was not how to measure intelligence or learning capacity but how a patient could maintain performance on intelligence tests after having his or her prefrontal lobes or right cortical hemisphere surgically removed. The explanation he proposed was that Intelligence B is a function of the concepts that a patient has developed through experience and that these concepts are resilient to cortical damage because they correspond to the activity of large assemblies of interconnected cells (neurons) in which many independent pathways can serve equivalent functions (Hebb, 1949 (Hebb, , 1980 ). Hebb's (1949) theory of cell assemblies not only provided a possible explanation for the persistence of intellectual abilities after extensive cortical damage but also for the correlations between sensory acuity and intelligence reported by Spearman (1904) . Specifically, the theory suggested that even simple perceptual capacities depended on cortical assemblies organized through sensory experiences and that thought processes corresponded to interactions between such experience-generated cortical assemblies. In Hebb's words, perception in the early stages is a consequence of a primitive learning process, but thereafter learning becomes a function of perception -the learning, that is, that is most characteristic of the adult human being -and a function of cognitive structures that originate in perception. (Hebb, 1980, p. 98) Thus, the cell assembly theory provided two potential sources for the observed correlations between acuity and intelligence. First, assemblies underlying concepts were hypothesized to arise from the assemblies underlying percepts, as intimated by both Galton (1883) and Harlow (1959) . Second, Hebb (1949) hypothesized that all cell assemblies were constructed by dynamically modifying cortical interconnections as a function of experience, that is, that a single neural process leads to the formation of both concepts and percepts. Consequently, an individual's intrinsic capacity to reorganize cortical circuits could constrain both perceptual and intellectual abilities. Hebb's (1949) ideas about cortical assemblies and the role of experience in cortical organization continue to strongly influence theories of cortical function (e.g., Harris, 2005) but have had less impact on current explanations of the neural mechanisms underlying intelligence.
Hebb's Theory of Cell Assemblies

An Integrative Framework for Understanding the Relationship Between Neural and Cognitive Plasticity
None of the theoretical viewpoints summarized above were developed to explain differences in cognitive plasticity across individuals or species. Nevertheless, they collectively provide a useful perspective from which to identify the mechanisms that determine such differences. Harlow's (1949) theory emphasizes the role of trial and error learning in concept formation and how organisms differ in their ability to acquire concepts as a function of their age and species. Hebb's (1949) theory also emphasizes the role of learning in intellectual capacity but focuses on the progressive learning and organization of percepts rather than on associative learning of stimulus-response relationships. Both Harlow (1949) and Hebb (1949) pointed to cortical complexity as a key determinant of what an organism can learn. Spearman's (1904) theory treats the effects of age and experience as confounds that can strongly impact measures of intellectual performance, thereby interfering with measurements of individual differences in intelligence. His ideas are similar to those of Hebb's, however, in that he postulates a close link between an individual's perceptual and intellectual capacities. Neither Harlow (1949) nor Hebb (1949) attempted to account for human individual differences in their theories, instead focusing on larger differences in intellectual capacity associated with gross differences in brain structure.
All three theorists recognized that intellectual capacity is dynamic and that certain global factors (e.g., age and cortical complexity) normally constrain the range of abilities that an individual can acquire. Hebb (1949) , in particular, was one of the first to emphasize that age-dependent changes in both perceptual and intellectual abilities likely reflect experience-dependent neural plasticity within cortical networks. Harlow (1949) and Hebb (1949) were also both impressed by the fact that massive damage to the cortex of adults often did not lead to dramatic deficits in intellectual capacity, suggesting that cortical networks were either highly redundant or functionally equipotential. Integrating these overlapping theoretical ideas into a common neurally based framework provides a way to more fully assess their explanatory power and to further their development.
The framework described below suggests that representational resolution constrains an individual's capacity to learn new cognitive skills and that an individual's ability to resolve stimulus representations largely depends on the functional properties of the cortical modules that he or she possesses. To a certain extent, the framework can be viewed as replacing Hebb's (1949) assemblies of generic brain "cells" with assemblies of diversified cortical modules that are customized through evolution and individual learning to differentiate the changing states of an organism's internal and external environment. As noted earlier, the framework identifies three properties of cortical modules that likely impact cognitive plasticity. First, it is proposed that the availability of cortical modules (their number and diversity) limits cognitive plasticity. This neural constraint is related to issues of brain size, because cortical volume limits the maximum number and diversity of cortical modules. Second, it is suggested that cognitive plasticity entails the ability to flexibly develop new circuit configurations and to switch between them, that is, that assemblies of cortical modules are reconfigurable. This neural constraint focuses on a particular representational control process among several that may maintain and control stimulus representations, and it thus builds on current ideas about the role of cognitive control in intellectual capacity. Finally, it is hypothesized that the extent to which networks of cortical modules can be customized (dynamically retuned) constrains cognitive plasticity; such retuning depends on mechanisms of neural plasticity.
The neural substrates that provide the foundation for the explanatory framework and their hypothesized roles are shown in Figure  2 . I have already briefly described how the availability, reconfigurability, and customizability of cortical modules may constrain an individual's representational resolution. The following sections review evidence showing how the structural and functional organization of cortical and subcortical networks relates to these three properties of cortical modules and that the capacity of cortical circuits to resolve stimulus representations may strongly determine the differences in cognitive plasticity seen within and across species and individuals. It is important to note that, although the current explanatory framework is motivated by numerous empirical findings from neuroscience research, it has yet to be systematically investigated in relation to differences in intellectual capacity within and across individuals or species, and thus it remains speculative. 
Representational Resolution: Cortical Modules Differentiate Stimulus Representations
Cognitive skill learning undoubtedly involves cortical processing (Pauli et al., 1994; Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999; Raichle, 1998; Reichle, Carpenter, & Just, 2000) . Prefrontal activity, interactions between cortical and subcortical regions, and the overall size and structure of cortical regions can thus strongly impact cognitive plasticity. Evolutionary considerations suggest further that the expansion of cortical networks reduces constraints on cognitive plasticity (Gibson, 2002; Sternberg & Kaufman, 2002) . One way that cortical processing may enhance cognitive plasticity is by expanding an organism's capacity to represent internal and external events. This could be achieved either by extending the temporal window within which events can be processed or by providing multiple representations of a single event in parallel (analogous to photos taken at various angles and magnifications). The availability of multiple "looks" at an event can provide an individual with more choices. Longer looks provide more opportunities for contingencies to reveal themselves and thus can also be viewed as additional representations of an event. To assess whether cortical networks expand an organism's representational resolution, it is important to consider how the structure of these networks varies across species.
Differentiation through progressive segregation is a ubiquitous feature of sensory processing circuits in the brain (Ebbesson, 1984; Hofman, 2003; Kaas & Collins, 2001; Metzner & Juranek, 1997) . On an evolutionary time scale, one sees the emergence of discrete sensory modalities as well as the division of unimodal sensory systems into parallel, somewhat redundant circuits with increasingly selective processing capacities (D. A. Clark, Mitra, & Wang, 2001; Krubitzer & Kaas, 2005; Northcutt & Kaas, 1995; Rakic, 1988; Striedter, 2006) . At a developmental scale, relatively diffusely connected sensory cortical networks that respond to a wide range of stimuli give way to more selective, precisely connected systems that are "sensitized" based on environmental conditions, especially during the so-called sensitive periods (Bence & Levelt, 2005; Johnson & Vecera, 1996; Stiles, 2000; Zhang et al., 2001) . Finally, as individual organisms learn from their experiences, one sees further refinement of cortical sensitivities and dynamic topographic reorganization of cortical networks (Buonomano & Merzenich, 1998; Weinberger, 2004) . This progression suggests a push toward neural mechanisms that enable greater differentiation and refinement of stimulus representations.
Inputs from sensory receptors are typically remapped multiple times in the mammalian central nervous system; different mappings afford different stimulus-response configurations (Metzner & Juranek, 1997) . Cortical extent and the number of cortical neurons thus appear to constrain an organism's capacity to differentiate stimulus representations. For example, a cat's ability to generalize learning about one tone to other tones of different frequencies can be predicted from the topography of frequency sensitivities in the cat's auditory cortex (R. F. Thompson, 1965 ; see also Orduña, Mercado, Gluck, & Merzenich, 2005) . In a similar vein, the spatial topography of auditory and somatosensory cortical sensitivities in dogs can be inferred simply from observing how they generalize conditioned responses (Pavlov, 1927) . The number of segregated functional maps in cortex also predicts an organism's capacity to differentiate stimulus representations. For instance, echolocating bats possess a larger number of specialized feature maps in auditory cortex, and primates have numerous specialized maps in visual cortex (see also R. O. Duncan & Boynton, 2003) . Thus, the structural features of cortical networks determine the separability of stimulus representations, thereby constraining what an organism can learn. Recent studies of auditory processing in humans similarly have suggested that cortical networks are critical for segregating auditory scenes and that such stimulus differentiation is intimately linked to more general intellectual abilities (Naatanen, Tervaniemi, Sussman, Paavilainen, & Winkler, 2001 ).
Evidence of a correspondence between discriminative capacities and more complex learning abilities is ubiquitous in comparative research. For example, the rate at which learning sets are acquired is predicted by the rate of discrimination learning in early sessions (Harlow, 1949 (Harlow, , 1959 . Additionally, stimulus salience, which reflects an organism's sensitivities to different stimuli, is a key parameter in several theories of animal learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . These theories identify salience as a major determinant of learning rate and asymptotic performance in a wide range of learning tasks.
Cognitive aging research also has revealed links between perceptual abilities, intellectual capacity, and cognitive plasticity. For example, the Berlin aging study found that sensory and sensorimotor variables predicted 59% of the reliable variance in measures of general intelligence Lindenberger, Scherer, & Baltes, 2001 ). Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for this correspondence, including the ideas that sensory deficits cause drops in IQ (Anstey & Smith, 1999) and that global changes in neural processing efficiency affect both processes (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994) . The current framework integrates these two hypotheses by suggesting that neural processing capacity is constrained by representational resolution.
The relationship between representational resolution and cognitive plasticity hypothesized in the current framework differs from the relationship between perceptual acuity and intelligence suggested by Galton (1883) and Spearman (1904) in that specific causal mechanisms (features of cortical networks) are proposed to account for this relationship. Because these mechanisms relate to brain structure, cases like Helen Keller's, in which sensory deficits are dissociated from intelligence, are not problematic. Cortical modules will continue to be available despite major losses of sensory inputs, and therefore sensory deficits should minimally impact the brain's overall representational resolving power. Not surprisingly, the framework predicts that cognitive skills that require information from a lost sensory modality will be impossible to learn since the brain will be unable to resolve the relevant external events. Note that unlike Spearman's theory, the present framework does not focus on discrimination abilities per se but instead on the brain's capacity to differentiate stimulus representations. Such differentiation includes not only discriminating sensory events but also recognizing and identifying internal and external events.
Several researchers have pointed to dissociations between particular measures of perceptual acuity and measures of specific intellectual capacities as evidence against a close link between acuity and intelligence (e.g., see Acton & Schroeder, 2001; Thorndike, Lay, & Dean, 1909) . Such evidence is not contradic-tory to the current framework because the framework presumes that different subsets of cortical modules mediate the learning and performance of different cognitive skills. Thus, the framework predicts that perceptual distinctions made with a greater number and diversity of cortical modules will be better predictors of an individual's cognitive plasticity than will distinctions requiring little or no cortical processing. However, the framework does not predict that an individual's ability to make any given perceptual distinction will be strongly correlated with his or her performance on intelligence tests.
Availability: The Number and Diversity of Cortical Modules Constrains Capacity
Size is a dominant factor in the organization of cortical networks. More space means more room for connections and the possibility of larger cell bodies. More neurons mean more possibilities for cell differentiation. Larger brains necessitate longer connections between cortical regions, but this in turn allows for more precise projections across regions. For example, animals with larger cortical regions will be better able to separate circuits involved in different aspects of sensorimotor coordination. The topography of cortical sensitivities and the cytoarchitectonic variability across cortical regions (e.g., Brodmann's areas) provide evidence that there is such a structural division of labor (see Figure  3 ). Sensory cortices, in particular, show disproportionate allocation of cortical regions to the processing of dense regions of receptor space (Allman, 1998; Catania & Kaas, 1995) . Interestingly, variation in the topography of cortical sensitivities across individuals can be as large or larger than variation across closely related species (Merzenich, 1985) . Inputs from other brain regions coming into the cortex are perpendicular to the cortical surface and are organized into columns, which reduces terminal overlap and increases the possibility of functional segregation. The six layers of neurons within cortex also allow for finer sensory processing (Swanson, 2003) and more expandable topographic structure (Striedter, 2006) . Finer grained topography in cortical networks increases opportunities for precise decomposition of inputs; precision necessitates (or at least benefits from) topographical organization. Thus, the most important role of increasing cortical size is to reduce constraints on cortical organization and, in particular, constraints on the differentiation of inputs.
Columnar geometry is a defining feature of cortical architecture Mountcastle, 1957 Mountcastle, , 1997 Mountcastle, , 1998 . Columnar organization varies predictably across individuals and species (Buxhoeveden & Casanova, 2002) , with the size of cortical macrocolumns reflecting the distribution of thalamic inputs (Stevens, 2001 (Stevens, , 2002 . Macrocolumns are discrete, polygonal structures (roughly hexagonal) consisting of varying numbers of minicolumns (ca. 60 -80), each of which may contain 80 -100 neurons (Favorov & Diamond, 1990) . Macrocolumns in cat visual cortex are significantly larger than those in rhesus monkeys, but the monkey's cortical columns contain more cells. So, the monkey's larger brain is associated with smaller but more complex minicolumns. In primates, the complexity of columnar composition in visual cortex is associated with higher visual acuity. However, in most cases it is unclear how variations in the structure of cortical columns relate to functional capacity either across or within species. Groups of cortical columns may function together as a coherent unit; cortical modules are one such unit.
The number of cortical modules in the mammalian brain has increased through evolution (Krubitzer & Kaas, 2005) . This evolutionary expansion relates directly to the number of minicolumns (Rakic, 1995) . The number of columns developed by an organism reflects the number of progenitor cells early in development (Rakic, 1988) ; the evolutionary expansion of cortex may similarly depend on the number of divisions that are possible (Rakic, 1995) . From this perspective, cortical modules containing essentially the same circuits are increased in number through duplication (Allman & Kaas, 1971; Kaas, 1984) . Consistent with this idea, multiple "redundant" maps of sensory surfaces with similar topographies are seen in the cortices of all vertebrates (Metzner, 1999) . Similarly, subcortical sensory pathways that provide inputs to sensory cortices reveal parallel decomposition (Swanson, 2003) . For example, the mammalian cochlear nucleus divides auditory inputs into six parallel streams (Young, 1997) . Evolutionary processes clearly select for cortical expansion, but duplication and segregation of cortical modules alone does not appear to be sufficient for generating functional advances. Differentiation of cortical modules is also necessary.
Two evolutionary mechanisms have been proposed to account for the divergent properties of cortical modules and associated increases in the number of cortical subdivisions. Kaas (1984) proposed that replicated cortical modules sharing a basic structural organization became specialized across generations. In contrast, Ebbesson (1980 Ebbesson ( , 1984 postulated a parcellation process in which the selective loss of inputs to cortical regions ultimately produced more specialized cortical subdivisions. In both Kaas's (1984) and Ebbesson's (1980 Ebbesson's ( , 1984 frameworks, unitary cortical processing modules divide (through mechanisms analogous to either mitosis or meiosis, respectively) to create multiple modules with functions similar to, but more specialized than, the original module. For example, in "primitive" marsupials, cortical regions responsive to different sensory modalities overlap with each other and with motor cortex, whereas in more advanced marsupials, these areas are more segregated (Abboitz, 1996) . Similarly, primary sensory cortices in primates are physically farther apart than in other smaller mammals and are surrounded by a larger number of specialized secondary sensory fields. Subcortically, greater sensory segregation in the thalamic nuclei of frogs relative to salamanders is associated with an increased ability to discriminate moving configurations (Ewert, 1984) . Animals with highly evolved sensory capacities (such as echolocating bats and electrolocating fish) possess the most segregated and functionally specialized sensory systems (Covey, 2005; Metzner & Juranek, 1997) . The evolutionary isolation and differentiation of cortical modules thus appears to facilitate finer distinctions between stimuli, leading to more appropriate behavior and more selective motor control.
It is less clear how the number and diversity of functional cortical modules vary across the lifespan. However, the expansion and shrinkage of cortex during early development and aging respectively suggest that the number of cortical modules might similarly change. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny in that columnar organization in fetal tissue is quite uniform. As individual sensory systems develop, there is selective pruning and sharpening of cortical response features. Surgically manipulating inputs to sensory cortex early in development can generate novel structural Figure 3 . "Cytoarchitectural studies of the lateral surfaces of the cerebral cortices of a series of primates and an insectivore, arranged by E. G. Jones in descending order of size by reference to the magnifications given by each of the authors in their original articles. At the top is the map for man, by Brodmann (1912) ; the sequence from the above left to below right, in order: orangutan, gibbon, and macaque (Mauss, 1910) , then lemur and an insectivore (Brodman, 1914) " (Mountcastle, 1998, p. 24) . Different patterns on the surface of each brain show cortical regions that neuroanatomists have classified as having distinctive cellular features (e.g., the distribution of neuronal types within columns varies across areas). Note that the number of distinctive regions decreases as the size of the brain and cortex decreases. organizations of cortical modules, demonstrating that environmental demands can increase the diversity of modules available (Kahn & Krubitzer, 2002; Sharma, Angelucci, & Sur, 2000) . Similarly, sensory deprivation during development leads to greater overlap in cortical connections and less selectivity to inputs (Chang & Merzenich, 2003; Zhang et al., 2001 Zhang et al., , 2002 , suggesting that the number and capacity of cortical modules also vary during development depending on an organism's experiences. It appears that as cortical modules develop they become progressively more selective, thereby increasing an organism's ability to differentiate stimulus representations.
Currently, there is only indirect evidence that the number and diversity of cortical modules constrain intellectual capacity. This is partly because it is difficult to manipulate these variables while measuring the resulting effects on cognitive plasticity. Across species, the number and diversity of cortical modules are correlated with the size of cortex (Jerison, 2002) . Consequently, previously identified correlations between intellectual capacities and cortical extent also apply, at least in part, to cortical modules. Across individuals, Harlow's (1949) experiments, which showed that monkeys with less cortex form learning sets more slowly, as well as Lashley's (1929) studies, which showed that a rat's capacity to learn to navigate a maze is correlated with the amount of cortical tissue remaining after surgery, provided some support for the idea that the absolute number of available cortical modules is an important determinant of learning capacity (see also R. Thompson, Crinella, & Yu, 1990) .
Reconfigurability: Cognitive Plasticity Depends on Flexible Neural Circuitry
Most researchers now agree that different brain regions serve different roles at different stages of cognitive skill learning (Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, & Bunge, 2006; Doeller, Opitz, Krick, Mecklinger, & Reith, 2006; Pauli et al., 1994; Poldrack et al., 1999) . In many cases, performance increases are correlated with decreased activity in some brain regions and increased activity in others (Raichle, 1998) . The involvement of any particular subset of brain regions in cognitive skill acquisition depends on task difficulty, an individual's level of expertise, and the particular task being performed. In some cases, subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia, hippocampus, or cerebellum seem to be particularly important, with different regions showing the most activity at different stages of acquisition (Poldrack et al., 2001; Poldrack et al., 1999; Raichle, 1998) . In other cases, cortical networks in the frontal lobes or parietal lobes show the greatest involvement (Pauli et al., 1994) . To further complicate matters, the specific set of cortical regions that becomes active during acquisition depends on the specific strategies that an individual uses during learning (Reichle et al., 2000) . This particular finding suggests that, even within the same cognitive skill learning task, different neural circuits could mediate similar performances.
At first glance, the reconfigurability of cortical circuits might seem to suggest that cortical modules are functionally interchangeable or equipotential. However, there is substantial evidence that the cortical modules within these distributed circuits serve unique specialized functions (e.g., . Mesulam (1998) has described the capacity for brain regions to dynamically shift affiliations from one functional network to another as selectively distributed processing. The circuits involved at any given stage of learning may represent "paths of least resistance;" that is, strategy selection may normally involve selecting the most efficient circuits (Reichle et al., 2000) .
A core hypothesis of the present framework is that cognitive plasticity depends on selectively distributed processing. Specifically, the framework presumes that specialized cortical modules throughout the brain can be used in a variety of combinations (and somewhat interchangeably) to enable the acquisition and performance of cognitive skills, as well as that variability in cognitive plasticity across individuals of different species and ages reflects variability in their capacity to reconfigure cortical modules. Although the mechanisms underlying dynamic circuit reconfiguration are not well understood, lampreys and even crustaceans show some capacity to rapidly reconfigure their neural circuits (Ayers, Carpenter, Currie, & Kinch, 1983; Harris-Warrick & Marder, 1991) , suggesting that this may be a fundamental feature of neural processing across many species.
Evidence indicating that individuals with greater intellectual capacity may be able to more flexibly configure their neural circuits has come primarily from electroencephalographic (EEG) studies in humans (Jausovec & Jausovec, 2000; Thatcher, North, & Biver, 2005) . For example, children with higher IQs show reduced background EEG coherence, indicating more differentiated activity across cortical regions (Gasser, Jennen-Steinmetz, & Verleger, 1987) . Conversely, low IQ adults show less differential neural activity across brain regions when performing a sentence verification task than do individuals with higher IQs (Neubauer, Freudenthaler, & Pfurtscheller, 1995) , and older individuals with lower IQs show less evidence of switching between brain regions during cognitive skill learning (Grady, Springer, Hongwanishkul, McIntosh, & Winocur, 2006) . Although such correlational studies have not shown that differences in cortical reconfigurability lead to differences in cognitive plasticity, they at least establish that this hypothesis is consistent with the known facts and suggest future experiments that could be conducted to establish a causal link (see below).
Customizability: Neuromodulatory Circuits Modulate Cortical Differentiation
So far, I have emphasized the role that cortical structure and dynamics can play in differentiating stimulus representations and in constraining cognitive plasticity. It is well known, however, that evolutionarily older subcortical systems ultimately control how cortical networks respond to all events. At the most basic level, subcortical regions modulate cortical responsiveness to inputs based on the sleep-wake cycle. When an organism is awake, subcortical, neuromodulatory systems containing neurons that project throughout cortex continuously gate processing of information. Several of these systems are known to impact the response properties of neurons in sensory cortex. Among these, the basal forebrain is thought to be particularly important for the activation, formation, and maintenance of stimulus representations. Neurons in the basal forebrain are the main source of acetylcholine in cortical networks and also are a source of GABA (gammaaminobutyric acid, an inhibitory neurotransmitter) and various neuropeptides that can impact cortical activity (Zaborszky, Pang, Somogyi, Nadasdy, & Kallo, 1999) . A wide range of data suggests that basal forebrain neurons affect not only how cortical networks respond to particular events but also how and when learning experiences change cortical sensitivities (for recent reviews, see Sarter, Hasselmo, Bruno, & Givens, 2005; Suga & Ma, 2003; Weinberger, 2003; Zahm, 2006) . Thus, subcortical, neuromodulatory systems that modulate activity levels in cortex appear to be critical to determining how experience remodels cortical architecture and how events are represented.
The idea that connections between cortical neurons may increase in strength or efficiency as a function of experience has been around since the first observations that such connections exist (Ramón y Cajal, 1904; Yuste & Bonhoeffer, 2001) . Historically, this form of neural plasticity was used mainly to explain how associative links between external stimuli and reflexive responses are created (Pavlov, 1927) as well as how memories are stored (Hebb, 1949) . It was thus somewhat of a surprise when researchers Wiesel and Hubel (1963) discovered that experience strongly impacted sensitivities in developing sensory cortical networks (see Bence & Levelt, 2005; and Stiles, 2000 , for recent reviews), and even more of a surprise when similar changes were observed in adult sensory cortex after injuries or learning experiences (reviewed by Buonomano & Merzenich, 1998; Calford, 2002; Cooke & Bliss, 2006; D. E. Feldman & Brecht, 2005; Kaas, 1991; Wall, Xu, & Wang, 2002) . The capacity of cortical networks to change as a function of experience is called cortical plasticity.
A ubiquitous finding in studies of developmental and learningrelated cortical plasticity is that the distribution of sensitivities across sensory maps is systematically altered on the basis of the sensory events that the organism experiences. Often, this involves expansion of the cortical region that responds selectively to a behaviorally relevant stimulus (e.g., Recanzone, Schreiner, & Merzenich, 1993) ; that is, the number of cortical modules that respond to the stimulus increases. Importantly, the size of the cortical region that is responsive to sensory inputs is a good predictor of the organism's ability to differentiate those inputs, as caricatured in the iconic, big-lipped, human somatosensory cortex homunculus. Experiences with stimuli can also increase the selectivity with which cortical neurons respond to a particular stimulus (Polley, Kvasnak, & Frostig, 2004) , effectively increasing the precision of available modules. Both kinds of changes may increase an organism's capacity to differentiate stimuli. Basal forebrain neurons likely contribute to cortical plasticity because both cortical expansion and retuning can be generated by externally controlling basal forebrain activity during the presentation of sensory events (Bakin & Weinberger, 1996; Kilgard & Merzenich, 1998; Mercado, Bao, Orduña, Gluck, & Merzenich, 2001) .
The roles that basal forebrain neurons are thought to play in cortical plasticity and sensory processing have been instantiated in a variety of qualitative (Suga & Ma, 2003; Weinberger et al., 1990) and computational models (Mercado, Myers, & Gluck, 2001; Yu & Dayan, 2005) . The basic idea is that neuromodulators (especially acetylcholine) released from basal forebrain projections to cortical neurons enhance responses to sensory inputs by increasing the probability that the inputs will generate action potentials. This in turn facilitates neural plasticity such that future responses to those particular inputs will also be enhanced. Collectively, these experience-dependent neuromodulatory effects are thought to increase the ability of sensory cortical networks to efficiently process behaviorally relevant stimuli.
One reason to expect that basal forebrain modulation might be an important factor in cognitive plasticity is that this region is extensively innervated by neurons in the prefrontal cortex, which is a cortical region often associated with variability in intelligence (e.g., Gray & Thompson, 2004; Shaw et al., 2006) . The connections between prefrontal cortex and the basal forebrain appear to be organized into large numbers of specialized channels, such that specific regions of the prefrontal cortex project to predictable basal forebrain regions (Zaborszky, 2002; Zahm, 2006) . These projections constitute distributed parallel circuits enabling multilevel concurrent processing that may provide a way for prefrontal circuits either to modulate the selectivity and plasticity of cortical responses to ongoing stimulus representations (Sarter, Hasselmo, Bruno, & Givens, 2005; Zaborszky, 2002) or to modulate learning based on estimates about the uncertainty of ongoing events (Yu & Dayan, 2005) . Processing information through parallel channels in the sensory cortices, prefrontal cortex, and basal forebrain could increase cognitive plasticity by enhancing the selective adjustment of components of stimulus representations (i.e., customizing cortical modules) or by facilitating rapid switching between processing modes (i.e., reconfiguring cortical circuits) when circumstances change (Mesulam, 1990; Sarter, Bruno, & Turchi, 1999) . In this way, the real-time, situation-dependent customization and reconfiguration of cortical modules may emulate evolutionary, developmental, and learning-dependent mechanisms for differentiating stimulus representations-all of these processes involve differentiation through segregation.
Whereas the relationship between basal forebrain modulation and sensory cortical plasticity is well established, evidence directly relating cognitive plasticity to either cortical reorganization or basal forebrain function is sparse and open to interpretation. On an evolutionary scale, animals with the most expansive cortices (e.g., humans and cetaceans), typically possess the largest basal forebrain regions (Marino et al., 2001; Zaborszky et al., 1999) and often show greater flexibility at learning cognitive skills (Marino, 2002) . Additionally, basal forebrain damage in rats impairs their ability to form learning sets in a discrimination reversal task, suggesting that this neuromodulatory system is important for "learning to learn" (Bailey & Thomas, 2001 ). In humans with Alzheimer's disease, loss of basal forebrain projections is associated with cognitive decline (e.g., see Fibiger, 1991; Wenk, 1997; Whitehouse et al., 1982) , but it is less clear how these deficits impact cognitive skill learning or intellectual capacity. Generally, it is difficult to interpret the behavioral and cognitive effects of basal forebrain damage because this region influences so many different neural systems and because no studies have been conducted directly relating the activity of basal forebrain neurons to the performance or learning of cognitive skills.
Explanations of Variability in Intellectual Capacity: Past and Present
Three neural mechanisms often proposed to account for differences in intellectual capacity across individuals and species are brain size, prefrontal cortex function, and brain speed or efficiency (for reviews, see Deary, 2000; MacPhail, 1982; Mackintosh, 1998) . In human studies, correlations between IQ and frontal lobe activity/structure have taken center stage as researchers attempted to identify unique circuits in the prefrontal cortex that enhance intellectual capacities (J. Duncan, 2001; Gray & Thompson, 2004; Koechlin et al., 2003; Shaw et al., 2006) . This neuropsychological approach has largely overshadowed research relating global differences in processing speed, efficiency, and adaptability to individual differences in intelligence (however, see Deary & Caryl, 1997; Garlick, 2002; Haier et al., 1992) . Studies of cross-species differences in intelligence traditionally focused on differences in neural processing power, as estimated from the size of various structures in the brain (Jerison, 1973; Rensch, 1956) . Each of these approaches has clarified the mechanisms underlying intellectual capacity, but none has provided a full account of how variations in neural circuits give rise to variations in cognitive plasticity.
What follows is a brief review of past evidence linking neural mechanisms to intellectual capacity. This review is selective, focusing primarily on evidence that bears on the current proposal that cognitive plasticity varies as a function of the availability, reconfigurability, and customizability of cortical modules. Several recent articles (Deary & Caryl, 1997; Gibson, 2002; Gray & Thompson, 2004; Jerison, 2002; McDaniel, 2005; Roth & Dicke, 2005) and books (e.g., Deary, 2000; Mackintosh, 1998; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003) provide more extensive reviews of the evidence collected to date. The integrative framework presented here extends these past perspectives, accounting for known correlations between brain anatomy and measures of intelligence as well as some data that have complicated interpretation of these correlations. A key difference of the current approach from most past efforts is that it makes specific predictions about how environmental conditions, learning, and knowledge acquisition can impact the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive plasticity. These predictions, some of which are presented in the following sections, suggest that both previously discarded and new approaches to understanding intellectual capacity can contribute to future progress.
Availability: The Role of Brain Size and Structure
Scientists and philosophers have related brain characteristics to cognitive capacities for several millennia. Historically, qualitative impressions of intellectual capacities were correlated with increasingly precise measurements of brain tissue (Jerison, 1973; Rensch, 1956) . Larger brain regions generally provide room for more complex circuitry, more dendritic expansion, more synapses, thicker myelin, more neurons, and larger neurons (Deary & Caryl, 1997) , all of which could increase functional capacity. The following discussion reviews recent attempts to relate differences in brain size to differences in intelligence. Collectively, these studies provide strong support for the idea that brain size in some way constrains cognitive plasticity.
Intelligence in nature: Innovations and social complexity. Recent attempts to correlate brain features with intellectual capacity across species often have involved testing closely related species on tasks that reflect their behavior in the wild and then relating differences in performance to differences in the relative size of particular brain regions (reviewed by Sherry, 2006) . The premise underlying such research is that enlargement of particular brain regions provides an organism with selective advantages when faced with specific ecological challenges. For example, larger hippocampal regions are thought to give certain species of birds an advantage in spatial tasks related to foraging (Biegler, McGregor, Krebs, & Healy, 2001; Volman, Grubb, & Schuett, 1997) , and a larger than normal cerebellum mediates the sophisticated electrolocation abilities of certain fish (Heiligenberg, 1990) . From this perspective, variability in relative brain region size across species reflects differences in adaptive specializations.
Unlike earlier studies of learning set acquisition, newer research often has focused on measuring performance across species, making it difficult to directly relate the results of these studies to variations in cognitive plasticity. For instance, across several different orders of birds, the relative size of a bird's forebrain is predictive of the likelihood that a particular species will engage in innovative foraging tactics (Lefebvre, Whittle, Lascaris, & Finkelstein, 1997) ; that is, bigger forebrains predict greater behavioral flexibility (see also Ratcliffe, Fenton, & Shettleworth, 2006; Reader & Laland, 2002; Sol, Duncan, Blackburn, Cassey, & Lefebvre, 2005) . However, innovation is a subjective measure that includes everything from eating an atypical food item (e.g., human vomit) to using an automatic sensor to open a bus station door (Lefebvre, Whittle, Lascaris, & Finkelstein, 1997) , and the extent to which different birds depend on reflexive actions versus learned perceptual-motor or cognitive skills during such foraging anomalies is essentially unknown. Consequently, little can be said at this stage about the relationship between cognitive plasticity and innovative foraging behavior.
The most extensive application of this new approach has been in studies of primate behavior. Unlike most other neuroecological studies of intellectual abilities in animals, studies of primate cognition have explicitly focused on understanding how intelligence evolved in humans-an unabashedly anthropocentric approach (Byrne, 1995; Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Corballis, 2007; Corballis & Lea, 1999; Sternberg & Kaufman, 2002) . In primates, the relative and absolute sizes of cortex are high compared with those of other brain regions (D. A. Clark et al., 2001; Dunbar, 1992) . Differences in the relative size of brain regions (especially the cortex) have been correlated with a wide range of abilities in primates thought to require high behavioral flexibility, including deception (Byrne & Corp, 2004) , social complexity (Dunbar, 2003; Lindenfors, 2005) , tool use, social learning, and innovative foraging (Reader & Laland, 2002) . The goal of such analyses has been to test the hypothesis that human intelligence evolved as an adaptive specialization for dealing with complex social situations. Unfortunately, the gross nature of the brain-behavior comparisons used in these studies makes them difficult to interpret (Bolhuis & Macphail, 2001; Healy & Rowe, 2007; Holekamp, 2007) . It thus remains unclear whether the observed differences in behavior reflect differences in cognitive plasticity or other factors, such as the relative effectiveness of foraging techniques in different species.
One approach to addressing limitations in neuroecological studies has been to measure additional brain features (e.g., neuronal density, myelination) that might more closely relate to the mechanisms that underlie differences in intellectual capacity (Gibson, 2002; Roth & Dicke, 2005 ). Pragmatic and ethical issues limit the extent to which such approaches can be used to compare brains across different primate species. However, recent technological and scientific advances have made it possible to precisely relate differences in brain tissue to standardized measures of intellectual capacity in the one species for which such standardized psychometric measures exist: humans.
Size differences in humans.
As noted earlier, most modern conceptions of human intelligence are derived from measures of individual performance on psychometric tests (for a review, see Neisser et al., 1996) . Typically, these tests only indirectly measure cognitive plasticity, focusing instead on how individuals apply problem-solving skills and knowledge. Recent dynamic testing procedures do measure cognitive skill acquisition, however (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998) . Research comparing performance on standard intelligence tests with performance on these dynamic tests has shown a strong positive relationship (Embretson, 1992; Embretson & Prenovost, 2000) . Thus, measures of an individual's IQ seem to provide a good indication of an individual's cognitive plasticity.
Recent analyses based on structural MRI measurements of brain tissue, as well as postmortem measures of volume, have shown significant positive correlations between brain volume and various IQ measures (Flashman, Andreasen, Flaum, & Swayze, 1997; Gignac, Vernon, & Wickett, 2003; Jensen & Sinha, 1993; McDaniel, 2005 ; G. F. Miller & Penke, 2007; Witelson, Beresh, & Kigar, 2006) , suggesting that humans with bigger brains are more likely to score higher on IQ tests. In addition to definitively establishing this basic relationship, structural MRI analyses suggest that men and women differ in terms of how the physical features of their brains relate to IQ measures. For example, in women the volume of white matter is more strongly correlated with IQ, whereas in men gray matter volume shows the strongest correlations (Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire, 2005) . Furthermore, this technique makes it possible to compare intellectual capacity with variations in the size of different brain regions (Colom, Jung, & Haier, 2006; Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire, 2004; Wilke, Sohn, Byars, & Holland, 2003) .
Consistent positive correlations between brain size and intellectual capacity, within and across species, indicate that levels of cognitive plasticity may be constrained by the size and structure of several different brain regions. The present explanatory framework suggests that size-related changes in both cortical and subcortical networks drive such correlations. In particular, it hypothesizes that larger brains afford a larger number and greater diversity of cortical modules as well as more options for configuring and customizing these modules. This in turn increases the organism's capacity to differentiate stimulus representations, thereby reducing constraints on cognitive skill learning.
Past ideas about why bigger brains are often better have focused on the amount of "extra" cortical tissue that certain large-brained species possess (Jerison, 1973) or on the overall computational power as estimated from the number of neurons or synapses available (Roth & Dicke, 2005) . In contrast, the current framework suggests that the amount of tissue and neurons an organism possesses is less critical than how the circuits within that tissue are organized and that it is resolving power that determines intellectual ability rather than general information processing capacity. A key corollary of this idea is that experience-dependent changes in the response features of cortical modules can impact how well different stimulus representations can be differentiated, which can in turn affect an organism's intellectual capacity.
Future directions and predictions: Beyond volumetric comparisons.
Many recent studies correlating brain size and intellectual capacity discount the relevance of absolute brain size and focus instead on relative measures (e.g., ratio-based brain metrics such as brain weight/body weight and neocortex volume/brain volume). This bias is driven partly by allometric considerations, partly because some non-primates have bigger brains than those of primates and partly because relative brain size measures are excellent predictors of species differences in behavioral flexibility (Healy & Rowe, 2007) . The predictive value of ratio-based brain metrics does not imply, however, that they are more informative than are absolute measures (Marino, 2006) , and there are surprisingly few convincing explanations as to why the relative distribution of different tissues within a brain should predict intellectual capacity better than will the absolute amount of each kind of tissue. Jerison (1973) suggested that a fixed cortical mass has fixed information processing capacities and that greater configurational complexity (which should vary as a function of the absolute amount of cortex) provides for greater behavioral plasticity. Gibson (2002) similarly argued that the enlargement of the cortex, cerebellum, and basal ganglia provided humans with increased information processing capacities. The assumption that absolute measures of brain size are less relevant than relative measures is further called into question by recent data showing that equal increases in the sizes of different brain regions do not always correspond to equal increases in the number of constituent neurons (Herculano-Houzel, Mota, & Lent, 2006) . In other words, constant size ratios across brain regions do not imply fixed levels of neural complexity, making it difficult to evaluate ratio-based brain metrics independently of absolute brain size. Global brain metrics have often been criticized as a gross oversimplification that ignores what is known about the organization of the brain (Healy & Rowe, 2007; Mace, Harvey, & CluttonBrock, 1980) , and more recent studies often instead measure the size of particular brain regions. This approach does not address the criticism, however, since brain regions invariably can be subdivided into yet smaller regions. Furthermore, measurements of brain region size are often expressed relative to the size of other brain regions, limiting their usefulness in the same ways noted above for relative measures of brain size. Perhaps more fundamentally, most existing volumetric measures of brain tissue do not reveal the impacts of experience on an organism's brain. Thus, these measures predict that if two chimpanzees possess equal amounts of brain tissue (or neurons, or synapses), then they will possess equivalent intellectual capacities, even if one of the chimpanzees lived in a lightless crate its whole life, whereas the other had extensive learning experiences in an enriching environment. These limitations suggest the need for new neuroanatomical measures that more directly reflect the mechanisms underlying intellectual capacity.
The present framework presumes that two brains could be identical in terms of their absolute or relative size but could differ greatly in terms of the number and diversity of cortical modules. Furthermore, two brains with a similar number and diversity of cortical modules could still confer different levels of cognitive plasticity depending on how selectively neuromodulatory neurons in subcortical regions can enhance cortical differentiation of stimulus representations. Thus, bigger brains are often predictive of higher levels of cognitive plasticity, but additional brain indices beyond size (particularly structural measures from the cortex and the basal forebrain) should provide better estimates of cognitive plasticity. The framework predicts that species with large brains but a limited ability to learn cognitive skills (e.g., cows) possess cortical modules that are more homogeneous (and/or less numerous) than those of species with high cognitive plasticity. Similarly, it predicts that variations in brain size within species, such as is seen across genders in humans, or in different breeds of dogs, need not strongly constrain intellectual abilities because the absolute size of cortical modules can potentially co-vary with brain size; that is, two differently sized brains can potentially contain a comparable number and diversity of cortical modules. Finally, the framework predicts that the number and diversity of cortical modules will vary with experience and that such differences will be reflected in the spatial distribution and selectivity of cortical columns. If so, then measures of cortical topography can potentially provide a way to differentiate an impoverished chimpanzee's brain from that of an enriched chimp.
To the extent that cortical maps constrain what is perceptually and behaviorally possible (and consequently what is learnable), functional measures of cortical topography may prove to be a useful alternative index of cognitive plasticity and intelligence across individuals and species. Of course, it currently is impractical to functionally map cortical sensitivities in most individuals, so indirect methods of assessing cortical sensitivities, such as the behavioral techniques developed by Pavlov (1927) , may be necessary. For example, species differ in their behavioral thresholds for resolving auditory frequencies, called auditory frequency difference limens (Fay, 1974) . Mammals with lower thresholds for discriminating differences between frequencies usually have larger numbers of auditory cortical fields with more selective response properties (Northcutt & Kaas, 1995) . Although quantitative comparisons of frequency difference limens and measures of cognitive plasticity across species have never been made, it is interesting to note that those mammals that are most sensitive to frequency differences (primates and delphinids) are also the mammals that form learning sets most rapidly. This suggests that indirect behavioral measures of an organism's psychophysical thresholds or cortical sensitivities may predict that organism's cognitive skill learning capacities at least as well as measures of tissue volume. In accord with the proposals of Galton (1883) and Spearman (1904) , the present framework predicts that measures of some perceptual thresholds (which reflect representational resolution of external stimuli) should be predictive of an individual's cognitive plasticity and intellectual capacity. Future work directly examining correlations between psychophysical thresholds, cognitive plasticity, and various anatomical and physiological brain metrics is needed to evaluate these predictions within and across species.
Currently, the lack of objective techniques for measuring intellectual capacity in non-humans almost necessitates an anthropocentric focus. The classical learning set approach developed by Harlow (1959) , which initially seemed to solve this problem, fell out of favor in part because differences in sensorimotor capacities across species often confounded the interpretation of cross-species differences in learning. If cognitive plasticity is constrained by an organism's capacity to resolve stimulus representations, however, then this turns such critiques of learning set research on their heads. Specifically, differences in the rate of learning set formation may actually result from differences in representational resolution rather than from methodological artifacts. In other words, organisms may behave most intelligently, and learn cognitive skills most effectively, when they are able to best differentiate the stimulus representations that they need to respond to or learn about. For example, rats show little ability to form learning sets when required to discriminate visual stimuli (Warren, 1965) but show abilities comparable with those of some primates when tested with olfactory stimuli (Slotnick et al., 2000) . A major advantage of learning set tasks as a measure of cognitive plasticity is that they provide information about the dynamics of cognitive skill acquisition as well as performance indices.
Another advantage of learning set tasks is that, with further development, they potentially can be used to study differences in intellectual capacity not only across species but also across individuals and throughout the lifespan. Studies of cognitive plasticity in human aging already make use of this approach. For example, training elderly individuals to improve memory recall through the use of mnemonics involves the formation of learning sets. Similar research with aging animals tested on traditional learning set measures has shown striking parallels with research on aging humans (Boutet et al., 2005; Harlow, 1959; Itoh, Izumi, & Kojima, 2001; Rumbaugh, 1970; Rumbaugh & McCormack, 1967) . Measures of individual differences in human intelligence that depend on measures of learning capacity (e.g., dynamic tests of IQ; Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998) may also prove useful for future studies of age-related changes in cognitive plasticity.
New learning set tasks may be particularly useful for measuring individual differences in the intellectual capacities of non-humans. Comparative researchers have rarely attempted to systematically measure variability in intelligence within a species (however, see R. Thompson et al., 1990; Thorndike, 1935) , although individual differences in learning capacity are noted in many comparative research reports. Measures of individual differences in learning set formation within species would avoid many of the confounds associated with cross-species comparisons of learning set formation and could facilitate analyses of the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive plasticity (Yokoyama, Tsukada, Watanabe, & Onoe, 2005) . Research on individual differences in intellectual capacity in non-humans can also assess the generality of theoretical explanations for such differences that have been derived from human studies. A basic prediction of the present framework is that individual differences in cognitive plasticity can be related to variability in cortical structure and physiology, independent of species. Future research focused on improving quantitative measures of cognitive plasticity in non-humans is essential to testing this prediction.
Correlational studies can provide only weak tests of the mechanisms underlying intellectual capacity, even with more refined measures of intellectual capacity and brain structure, because one can never infer causation from correlation. New measures of cognitive plasticity in non-humans could make it possible to directly test how various brain features impact cognitive plasticity because neural variables can be more flexibly controlled in nonhumans. In particular, techniques are available for (a) varying the size of brain regions; (b) varying the number and diversity of cortical modules; (c) genetically and surgically engineering chimera; (d) varying the rate of an organism's development and aging; (e) temporarily disengaging discrete brain regions; (f) manipulating neural plasticity mechanisms; and (g) controlling basal forebrain activity. Additionally, artificial selection can be used to generate strains of animals of a particular species that differ in their perceptual and cognitive abilities. For example, cultural domestication has generated a wide variety of dogs, with large differences in brain size and "adaptive specializations" (e.g., bloodhounds vs. sheep dogs). In the laboratory, rodents have been bred to solve mazes well or poorly (Heron, 1935; Plomin, 2001) , and flies have been bred to possess specific learning deficits (Waddell & Quinn, 2001) . Genetic engineering has also been used to create mice with heightened learning capacities (Chen et al., 2003; Tang et al., 1999) . These artificially diversified populations of individuals provide unique opportunities for examining the relationship between neural structure and intellectual capacity (see also R. Thompson et al., 1990) .
The current framework suggests that if animals are selectively bred or engineered to increase the diversity and number of cortical modules, then this should increase their cognitive plasticity. If these features are selectively changed in subregions of the brain, then this could selectively increase the capacity to learn a subset of cognitive skills; for example, a dog breed might be developed that has exceptional numerical capacities. Obviously, not all cognitive skills can be studied in all species. A basic assumption of the framework, however, is that different cognitive skills depend on fundamentally similar modes of cortical processing and are constrained in similar ways. Comparative experiments can thus clarify how variability in cortical modules contributes to cognitive plasticity and intellectual capacity as well as the relationship between absolute brain size, structural complexity, and behavioral flexibility.
Reconfigurability: Maintenance and Control of Representations
In the last century, one cortical region in particular has become strongly associated with the superior intelligence of humans: the frontal cortex. The frontal lobes are currently considered by many to be the seat of cognitive control (Koechlin et al., 2003; Wood & Grafman, 2003) , supporting humans' intellectual capacities through the flexible coordination of decision processes and memory (Blair, 2006; J. Duncan, 2001; Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005) . The relative size of the human frontal lobes in comparison with that of most other mammals is sufficient evidence for many to conclude that this brain region may be a unique source of human intellectual capacity. There are many theories about how cortical circuits in the frontal lobes contribute to intellectual capacity (e.g., Blair, 2006; J. Duncan, 2001; Fuster, 2001; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; West, 1996) , none of which questions the idea that frontal circuits are key to intellectual performance.
Localizing intelligence: A preoccupation with prefrontal cortex. Structural MRI measures have linked differences in the volume of gray matter in frontal cortex to measures of general intelligence (Haier et al., 2005 ; P. M. Thompson et al., 2001) , suggesting that the makeup of frontal circuits constrains intellectual capacity (Gray & Thompson, 2004) . Consistent with this interpretation, complex changes in the thickness of frontal cortex during development are also correlated with changes in IQ (Shaw et al., 2006) . Frontal lobe activity (especially in the prefrontal cortex) also tends to be associated with measures of intelligence (e.g., Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003; Gray & Thompson, 2004) . For example, in one positron emission tomography study that compared cortical blood flow as participants performed three tasks used to measure intelligence versus three control tasks, the greatest relative increase in blood flow occurred in the lateral prefrontal cortex for all three IQ-related tasks (J. Duncan et al., 2000) . Some researchers have argued that the consistent association of parts of the frontal cortex with measures of intelligence is evidence for a highly specialized frontal system that provides humans with the ability to flexibly control their cognitive acts (Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara, 2003; Koechlin et al., 2003) .
On the other hand, although regions within the frontal cortex often show the largest correlations with measures of intelligence in structural imaging studies, the volume of several other cortical and subcortical regions is also predictive of IQ (Andreasen et al., 1993; Colom et al., 2006) . For example, gray matter volume within the temporal lobe is positively correlated with measures of IQ (Haier et al., 2004) , and decreased overall cerebellar volume is associated with a lower IQ (Allin et al., 2001) . Additionally, fMRI measures show that activation during the performance of intelligence tests can be broadly distributed across both cortical and subcortical regions (Esposito, Kirkby, Van Horn, Ellmore, & Berman, 1999; Gray et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2006; Prabhakaran, Rypma, & Gabrieli, 2001; Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997) . Furthermore, damage to the frontal lobes often has little impact on the performance of well-learned cognitive skills or on the IQ of adults (Milner, 1982) , and children born with grossly deficient or missing frontal lobes can do quite well in school (Ackerly, 1964) . In one instance, a 16-year-old that had both prefrontal lobes surgically removed showed normal intellectual capacities and was able to live independently (Hebb, 1949) . These findings argue against the notion that frontal circuits provide humans with unique, specialized processing that is critical to cognitive skill learning or performance.
An alternative view of prefrontal function is that some circuits in the frontal lobes may serve to monitor and facilitate cognitive acts rather than to control and select them (Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003; Bunge et al., 2005; J. Duncan, 2001) . Consistent with this interpretation, individuals with a high IQ tend to rely on frontal cortex less as they gain mastery of a cognitive skill (Gevins & Smith, 2000) . Further evidence that a major function of frontal cortical circuits is to facilitate processing in other brain regions came from studies of monkeys (Fuster, 2001; Genovesio, Brasted, Mitz, & Wise, 2005; Levy & Goldman-Rakic, 2000; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Petrides, 1996; Romo & Salinas, 2003) . In particular, measurements of prefrontal activity in monkeys have been key in establishing that this region maintains activity that relates to the specific identity of remembered stimuli (Constantinidis, Franowicz, & Goldman-Rakic, 2001 ). These findings closely parallel results from human studies showing a close relationship between intelligence and working memory (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Broder, 2003; Conway et al., 2003; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) . Humans are not the only animals that can maintain information in memory, and so researchers have looked to other frontal lobe functions to explain the exceptional intellectual capacities of humans. Two human abilities that are thought to be fundamental to human cognition and learning are language and imitation. Both abilities have been associated with specialized circuits in the frontal lobes, particularly in Broca's area and surrounding regions (Arbib, 2005; Grodzinsky, 2006; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) , and both may contribute significantly to an individual's cognitive plasticity (a more detailed discussion of how these abilities contribute is provided below).
The extent to which information about past events can contribute to ongoing learning and decision making processes depends on how well representations can be neurally maintained in the absence of stimulation. Thus, one way that prefrontal cortex may enhance cognitive plasticity is by contributing to the maintenance of stimulus representations. It is important to note, however, that other cortical regions also show a capacity to maintain stimulus representations similar to that seen in prefrontal cortex (Romo & Salinas, 2003) . For example, when monkeys identify visual images as being either the same or different as images they have seen in the recent past, activity in their premotor cortex is quite similar to that observed in prefrontal cortex . Broad similarities in patterns of cortical activity seen in recordings from various regions in monkeys performing cognitive skills suggest that numerous cortical regions contribute to intellectual performance, consistent with data from human neuroimaging studies.
The contributions of frontal lobe circuits to representational maintenance are just one way that this brain region may impact cognitive plasticity. Prefrontal networks are also thought to function in the control of attention and response inhibition, thereby constraining the ways in which representations can be used (Barkley, 1997; Blair, 2006; Craik & Bialystok, 2006; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2006; West, 1996) . Control of representational processes may enable an organism to concentrate, consider various alternatives, suppress default responses, and access knowledge of similar past situations. The influence that cognitive control can have on cognitive plasticity is most clearly suggested by changes in intellectual capacity observed across the human lifespan.
Cognitive development and cognitive aging. The saying "you can't teach an old dog new tricks" illustrates the common perception that there is a strong link between aging and cognitive plasticity. Experimentally confirming this adage is difficult, however, because changes in intellectual capacity are confounded with, or are directly a result of, decreased sensory resolution, processing speed, motor control, and memory abilities. Measuring cognitive plasticity during early development is similarly complicated by systematic improvements in these processes. Nevertheless, psychometric measures of intelligence consistently indicate that a number of cognitive capacities increase during development, reach an asymptote, and then decline in later years (see, e.g., Li et al., 2004) , as everyday experience would suggest. A simplistic interpretation of these findings is that cognitive plasticity initially increases with age, then stabilizes, and finally decreases.
The development and functional capacity of several frontal lobe regions show a similar trend, with decrements in frontal function accounting for at least some of the decrements seen in intellectual capacity associated with aging (Bugg, Zook, DeLosh, Davalos, & Davis, 2006) . Development and deterioration of frontal lobe structure and function across the lifespan are often associated with respective corresponding increases and decreases in cognitive control (reviewed by Craik & Bialystok, 2006; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2006; West, 1996) . This is not to say that the ability to selectively process representations is the only, or even the major, factor that determines age-related changes in intellectual capacity. Processing speed and working memory capacity also decrease later in the lifespan (Hertzog, 1991; Salthouse, 1992 Salthouse, , 2000 , and both are correlated with individual differences in intelligence (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Fry & Hale, 1996 . Memory search abilities (a type of cognitive control) appear to be closely related to processing speed in older adults, but not in younger adults (Baron & Mattila, 1989; Hertzog, Cooper, & Fisk, 1996; Verhaeghen & Marcoen, 1996) . Thus, processing speed, memory capacity, and memory control all deteriorate in parallel in elderly individuals, which likely contributes to decreases in intellectual capacity (Salthouse, 1996) .
Developmental and lifespan researchers often focus on identifying the range of cognitive plasticity in humans and the types of experiences that facilitate or constrain plasticity (Baltes, 1987; Li, 2003; Stiles, 2000) . In the context of aging research, cognitive plasticity is typically discussed in relation to techniques for forestalling cognitive decline (Kramer et al., 2004) and is operationally defined as within-person variability in performance during training on cognitive tasks (e.g., Verhaeghen & Marcoen, 1996; Yang, Krampe, & Baltes, 2006) . Expertise and practice seem to counteract declines in certain cognitive skills, suggesting that age-related changes occur in parallel across multiple cognitive domains rather than reflecting a global change in cognitive capacity (see Kramer et al., 2004) .
Many of the cognitive tasks that researchers have used to study cognitive skill learning during aging explicitly measure the effects of training on memory abilities. For example, researchers have measured memory search performance in young and old individuals and the effects of practice on their performance (Fisk, Cooper, Hertzog, & Anderson-Garlach, 1995; Hertzog et al., 1996) . In a basic memory search task, participants are instructed to hold items in memory and then to report on whether a probe item is in the set. Other memory tasks require participants to use mnemonics to facilitate recall of episodic memories (Baltes & Kliegl, 1992; Singer, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 2003; Verhaeghen & Marcoen, 1996) . Measures of training-related increases in memory search abilities in cognitive aging research are comparable in many respects with dynamic tests of intelligence (Embretson & Prenovost, 2000; Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998) as well as measures of learning set formation in comparative research. Each technique involves using patterns of acquisition to assess differences in intellectual capacity. Interestingly, different species show the same basic pattern of increasing, stabilizing, and declining cognitive capacities as a function of age that is seen in humans, despite large differences in lifespan duration and in frontal lobe structure (de Magalhaes & Sandberg, 2005; Kausler, 1994) . For example, studies in monkeys (Harlow, 1959; Itoh et al., 2001; Rumbaugh, 1970; Rumbaugh & McCormack, 1967) , and dogs (Boutet et al., 2005) , show that their capacity to acquire learning sets increases during development and then decreases during aging. In addition, the counteracting effects of training experiences on cognitive decline are also seen in other animals (Milgram, 2003; Milgram, SiwakTapp, Araujo, & Head, 2006) . What varies across species is not the dynamics of cognitive plasticity across the lifespan but rather the duration of the developmental process, the nature of the cognitive skills learned, and asymptotic performance levels. According to the present framework, variations in an organism's ability to learn cognitive skills throughout the lifespan reflect age-related variations in its ability to differentiate stimulus representations.
The general finding from these and related studies of cognitive skill learning is that older adults do not benefit from practice to the same extent as younger adults, although the progress they show is qualitatively similar (Fisk & Rogers, 1991; Rogers, Fisk, & Hertzog, 1994; Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & Goossens, 1992) . Generally, older individuals are slower to learn and seldom reach the levels of performance achieved by younger adults, suggesting that as a group their cognitive plasticity is lower. There are different patterns of learning, however, depending on the specific skill being practiced and on initial levels of performance Verhaeghen & Marcoen, 1996; Verhaeghen et al., 1992) . For example, younger adults show a greater capacity than aged adults to learn timed memory search skills, but elderly individuals show greater improvement than young individuals when speeded responses are not required (Baron & Mattila, 1989) . The observation that individuals show different dynamics when acquiring different cognitive skills, despite similarities in learning trajectories, suggests that cognitive plasticity is a local constraint obeying global rules. In the present explanatory framework, what this means is that representational resolution can vary as a function of the situation that an organism faces (leading to differences in cognitive plasticity) but that the underlying mechanisms that determine the organism's ability to differentiate stimulus representations will be the same across all situations. Thus, an individual's intellectual capacity can vary greatly depending on the types of problems to be solved (as suggested by proponents of theories describing multiple intelligences, e.g., Gardner, 1983) , but there will still be a common source of variance across these domains (as suggested by Spearman, 1904) since ultimately representational resolution is limited by the structure and adaptability of the individual's cortical networks.
The current framework characterizes the development and deterioration of cognitive control as variability in the reconfigurability of cortical modules. It does not specify the prefrontal cortex (or any other brain region) as a locus of control and, therefore, does not predict major losses in cognitive plasticity or intellectual capacities if this region is no longer present, for example, after the frontal lobes are surgically removed. Instead the framework hypothesizes that prefrontal circuits can modulate the representational resolution of cortical circuits by (a) facilitating the customization of cortical modules via their projections to the basal forebrain and (b) enhancing the reconfigurability of cortical modules by inhibiting some while maintaining the activity of others. Thus, prefrontal circuits may supplement existing cortical mechanisms for differentiating stimulus representations without adding any unique functions that are characteristic of (or essential for) the intellectual abilities of humans.
Future directions and predictions. Neural circuits involving a fixed number and diversity of cortical modules can vary greatly in terms of their reconfigurability depending on how those modules interact. Case studies of human patients have indicated that when substantial portions of cortex (including prefrontal cortex) are removed or were never present, cognitive plasticity in some individuals remains relatively high. The neural changes that occur to compensate for large losses of tissue are essentially unknown. Neuroimaging studies in such patients, especially during the learning of cognitive skills, could provide new insights into how their cortical function differs from normal.
Relatively little is known about how the suite of neural circuits involved in cognitive skill acquisition varies across individuals or species. Instead, neuroimaging research has focused on identifying general activation patterns that are consistent across many individuals (e.g., group averages of relative changes in activity). Within-subject fMRI studies can provide new ways of identifying factors that constrain an individual's intellectual capacity. For example, real-time, fMRI-based neurofeedback experiments, in which participants voluntarily control blood flow in different cortical regions (deCharms et al., 2004 (deCharms et al., , 2005 , can be used to experimentally test the framework's predictions about the reconfigurability and availability of cortical modules. Neuroimaging studies have revealed specific brain regions that are often involved as participants learn particular cognitive skills. With practice, participants can improve their ability to control regional activation through feedback from fMRI images (deCharms et al., 2004; Yoo et al., 2006) . Using this technique, participants could gradually increase the number of co-activated cortical modules within one or more brain regions typically associated with acquisition or performance of a cognitive skill, thereby potentially increasing the availability of relevant cortical modules before the individuals attempt to learn that cognitive skill. The present framework predicts that individuals that improve their ability to selectively activate the relevant regions should benefit from this practice during cognitive skill learning (i.e., this practice should increase their cognitive plasticity)-in effect, these individuals will have enhanced their ability to select relevant cortical modules.
The present framework similarly predicts that if individuals can learn to selectively control activity in their prefrontal cortex or basal forebrain, then this should enhance cognitive plasticity across a wide range of tasks. Studies demonstrating that targeted manipulation of cortical activation can improve (or degrade) an individual's capacity to learn cognitive skills before training on that skill has begun would strongly support the proposed relationship between cortical function and cognitive plasticity.
Customizability: Neural Efficiency and Plasticity
Whereas recent investigations of links between human intelligence and neural circuitry heavily emphasize prefrontal function, earlier work suggested that differences in global efficiency might account for variability in intellectual capacity across individuals (see Deary & Caryl, 1997; Mackintosh, 1986 , for reviews). The basic idea is that faster brains that can process information more efficiently should have greater capacity, which is reflected in higher IQs. This line of reasoning implies that circuits distributed throughout the brain operate differently (e.g., more rapidly or efficiently) in more intelligent individuals, rather than just a few critical circuits operating differently. As noted earlier, behavioral evidence has shown a close correspondence between processing speed and intelligence measures across the lifespan. This behavioral work is paralleled by studies showing correlations between temporal features of brain potentials (e.g., evoked potentials) and IQ (Caryl, 1994; Deary & Caryl, 1997) . For example, shorter latency P300s (a positive deflection within evoked potentials that peaks around 300 ms) are associated with higher IQs (Bazana & Stelmack, 2002; McGarry-Roberts, Stelmack, & Campbell, 1992) . Other evidence suggesting that faster brains may be more likely to yield higher IQs has come from positive correlations between intelligence measures and measures of both nerve conduction velocity (Reed, 1993 (Reed, , 2004 and temporal processing (Deary & Stough, 1996; Fink & Neubauer, 2005; Helmbold et al., 2006) .
Neuroimaging studies showing increased frontal lobe activation in individuals with lower IQs have reinforced the notion that efficiency yields capacity (e.g., Haier et al., 1992 Haier et al., , 1988 Neubauer, Fink, & Schrausser, 2002) . Specifically, these findings suggest that inefficient use of frontal circuits (evidenced by high levels of activity) is associated with lower intellectual abilities. Furthermore, one can actually see gradual decreases in frontal activation as an individual's proficiency at performing a cognitive skill increases (Ramsey, Jansma, Jager, Van Raalten, & Kahn, 2004) . This disengagement of frontal cortical regions is associated with an increased capacity to perform multiple tasks in parallel, lending credence to the idea that efficiency affords capacity. Thus, although intellectual engagement often is associated with increases in frontal activity (e.g., J. Duncan et al., 2000; Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999; Koechlin et al., 2003) , it appears that higher activation of frontal circuits per se does not provide an individual with above average intellectual capacities.
Several mechanisms can potentially account for variability in neural efficiency across individuals, including arborization of cortical neurons, cerebral glucose metabolism, nerve conduction velocity, sex hormones, and others (reviewed by Neisser et al., 1996) . Faster processing with minimal circuitry does not guarantee enhanced learning capacity, however, and thus it remains unclear how differences in neural efficiency might impact cognitive plasticity. Slower processing might limit the availability and fidelity of stimulus representations, which should reduce cognitive plasticity according to the present explanatory framework.
The wave of scientific studies of neural efficiency has receded in the past decade, only to be replaced by burgeoning interest in the role that neural plasticity plays in behavioral flexibility. The simplest hypothesis about how neural plasticity relates to cognitive plasticity is that there is a direct relationship: Greater neural plasticity means greater intelligence. Variability in levels of neural plasticity across individuals could affect how rapidly an individual's brain adapts to new situations, which could translate into differences in intellectual capacity (Garlick, 2002) . Different abilities require different connections across circuits; neural plasticity guided by experience establishes these patterns of connections. Because many neural circuits exhibit neural plasticity, variations in this capacity could potentially affect a wide variety of abilities. Different levels of neural plasticity across individuals could impact the number and complexity of neural connections as well as the rate at which new experiences lead to reorganization. These factors could, in turn, affect processing speed and neural efficiency. Genetic manipulations that enhance neural plasticity in mice do seem to facilitate certain kinds of learning (Tang et al., 1999) , consistent with the idea that neural plasticity constrains learning capacity.
These recent proposals about how neural plasticity relates to individual differences in intelligence have extended the classical view, derived from comparative neuroanatomy studies, that brain structure and complexity constrain behavioral flexibility (Jerison, 1973; Lashley, 1949; Rensch, 1956) . The hypothesis that variability in neural plasticity determines differences in intellectual capacity currently has limited explanatory power because (a) there is no straightforward way to measure differences in the rate at which neural circuits can change with sufficient precision to make crossindividual comparisons possible; (b) optimal levels of neural plasticity likely vary considerably depending on the nature of the intellectual tasks to be learned, the existing circuitry that might be engaged, and the maturity of the individual's brain; and (c) changes in learning rate do not generally account for differences in what it is possible to learn-learning capacity is much more dependent on how inputs are represented and on how a network learns.
The current integrative framework addresses these limitations by suggesting a specific role for neural plasticity beyond just making connections stronger or more efficient. Specifically, the framework proposes that cortical plasticity enables an organism to reallocate and retune cortical modules to increase overall representational resolution, thereby increasing cognitive plasticity. Both the structure of cortical networks and the selectivity with which basal forebrain projections can modulate activity in particular cortical regions are hypothesized to limit how precisely cortical modules can be customized. From this perspective, it is not the overall capacity to change cortical connection strengths that constrains an individual's intellectual capacity (Garlick, 2002) but the brain's capacity to dynamically adjust the modifiability of discrete sets of cortical modules as well as the likelihood that particular neural regions will become active during the acquisition or performance of a cognitive skill. In this way, the number and diversity of cortical modules that an organism engages during learning or performance of a particular cognitive skill can change as a function of experience. As noted previously, this proposal can be viewed as an extension of Hebb's (1949) hypothesis that assemblies of neurons accumulate functional capacity based on experience. The contribution of the current framework to Hebb's hypothesis is the idea that structural features of an organism's brain constrain how effectively such assemblies can be formed as well as the suggestion that variations in these structural features within and across individuals and species may account for differences in intellectual capacity.
Future directions and predictions: Brain building. The present framework predicts that improving an individual's representations of external stimuli can increase his or her capacity to learn cognitive skills involving those stimuli. One way to increase representational resolution might be through intensive training. Recent work showing that training programs designed to rehabilitate children with language learning impairments can improve not only children's auditory perceptual acuity (Merzenich et al., 1996) but also their language comprehension skills provides some support for this prediction. Such training-related behavioral changes are associated with changes in cortical activation patterns (Temple et al., 2003) , which may reflect changes in the number of cortical modules engaged during performance of the skill.
This prediction can be further tested by controlling an animal's experiences during development (Hebb, 1949) . Enriching a rat's environment, for example, increases dendritic branching in cortex (Rosenzweig, 1966; van Praag, Kempermann, & Gage, 2000; Volkmar & Greenough, 1972) as well as the strength of physiological responses (Engineer et al., 2004) . With age, the topographical organization of cortical maps deteriorates in rats, in parallel with decreases in perceptual acuity and behavioral flexibility (Coq & Xerri, 2000 Leblanc, Weyers, & Soffie, 1996; Ohta, Matsumoto, & Watanabe, 1993; Turner, Hughes, & Caspary, 2005) . Enriched environments can attenuate this effect (Coq & Xerri, 2001) . Similarly, training programs and enriched environments can help elderly humans to delay declines in cognitive capacity (see Kramer et al., 2004 , for a review). The present framework suggests that such experience-dependent changes reflect continuous customization of cortical modules. Thus, it pre-dicts that experimental manipulations that block cortical plasticity mechanisms should reduce the beneficial impacts of enrichment, and manipulations that enhance these mechanisms should amplify the benefits of enrichment.
Impacts of Imitation and Language Abilities on Cognitive Plasticity
The variety and complexity of cognitive skills possessed by adult humans suggest that cognitive plasticity is greater in humans than in most other organisms. Historically, there have been heated debates about why this is so. One group of thinkers has focused on explaining why there is such a great intellectual divide between humans and other animals (e.g., Dennett, 1997; Fodor, 1975) . This group has proposed explanations for human intellectual abilities ranging from divine providence (Descartes, 1637 (Descartes, /1999 to the existence of specialized neural language centers (Pinker, 1994) ; these proposals can be glossed as "enhanced cognitive plasticity results from extra parts." A second group of thinkers (exemplified by Darwin, 1871) has proposed that the intellectual separation between humans and other animals is not as great as it might at first appear (for recent reviews, see Heyes & Huber, 2000) . This group recognizes that cognitive performance in humans far exceeds that of other animals but questions whether the basic cognitive processes that underlie these performances are substantially different from those seen in many other organisms. From the Darwinian perspective, it is not the case that humans learn cognitive skills differently from other animals by using special humanspecific brain circuits. Rather, humans may simply learn different cognitive skills and may do so more rapidly and efficiently than can most other species, using the same basic kinds of neural circuits that many organisms possess. Darwin's ideas ultimately gave rise to the fields of comparative psychology, animal learning, and comparative cognition, which have produced a great deal of behavioral data pertinent to understanding cognitive plasticity. Although clear examples of cognitive skill learning by nonhumans remain relatively rare, there are now sufficient demonstrations of animals learning to count, classify, construct, and describe objects to reject the claim that non-humans are mindless machines (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003) .
Past explanations of the neural mechanisms underlying intelligence reflect earlier beliefs about why the intellectual capacities of humans differ from those of other animals. For instance, much of the recent effort to relate brain characteristics to human cognition and intelligence has focused on identifying and localizing unique features of hominid brains that yield new and special abilities such as language or mental time travel. This approach melds well with neo-Cartesian ideas about how specialized extra parts provide humans with intellectual capacities beyond those of all other animals. Parallel efforts to relate differences in intelligence across species or individuals to variability across numerous brain regions are more consonant with the Darwinian proposal that such differences vary along a continuum. A basic premise of the current framework is that both approaches can potentially provide important insights about the neural mechanisms that constrain cognitive plasticity.
One aspect of human intellectual abilities that there is little disagreement about is that culture and language play important roles. Both language and imitation abilities are associated with specialized functions in specific subregions of frontal cortex (Arbib, 2005; Grodzinsky, 2006; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) , consistent with the hypothesis that unique circuits in the frontal lobes are critical to the intellectual abilities of humans. In contrast, the current framework proposes that frontal circuits simply supplement existing mechanisms for customizing and reconfiguring cortical modules. Consequently, it implicitly endorses the Darwinian proposal that humans and other animals learn cognitive skills in essentially similar ways and that the intellectual capacities of humans do not depend on any "extra parts" that are unique to humans. The following discussion provides a speculative account of how culture and language may amplify human cognitive plasticity by increasing the capacity of human brains to differentiate stimulus representations.
Generalized Imitation
Several prominent psychologists have theorized that children learn extensively by imitating the actions of others (Bandura, 1977; N. Miller & Dollard, 1941; Piaget, 1953) . It has also been suggested that imitation is fundamental to cultural transmission of information and the development of human societies (Blackmore, 2000; Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1995) . From these perspectives, imitation abilities are critical to the development of intellectual capacities in humans. A common correlate of these proposals is that humans rely on learning through imitation to a much greater extent than do other animals and that this is one of the reasons that humans are able to learn cognitive skills that other animals do not.
Researchers continue to debate whether animals other than humans have comparable capacities for learning through imitation (Laland & Janik, 2006; Rendell & Whitehead, 2001; Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004) . Although numerous species have demonstrated the ability to imitate some actions (for a review, see Zentall, 2006) , only a few such as bottlenose dolphins (Herman, 2002) and great apes (Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Hayes & Hayes, 1952) have shown the ability to flexibly imitate actions on command. In these studies, trainers taught individuals to apply a general rule that can be glossed as "copy the action most recently observed" (Zentall & Akins, 2001) . The ability to imitate on command is called generalized imitation.
A key aspect of generalized imitation is that it requires an individual to retain information about past events and then use these memories to select appropriate actions. In particular, generalized imitation involves using long-term or reference memories to recognize when a copying strategy is appropriate as well as using working memory for actions recently observed. The dependence of generalized imitation on memory abilities suggests that memory capacity and fidelity may strongly constrain the contribution of imitation to cognitive skill learning. Thus, the likelihood that an animal with imitation abilities might achieve levels of cognitive plasticity comparable with those of a child depends on how well its neural circuits can generate, actively maintain, and flexibly access representations of internal and external events. From the perspective of the current framework, this means that animals with cortical modules that are less available and less reconfigurable will benefit less from imitation abilities.
If children learn cognitive skills by imitating others, then the mechanisms that constrain imitation will in turn limit levels of cognitive plasticity. For example, if frontal circuits serve to in-crease the availability and reconfigurability of cortical modules (as proposed in the current framework), then this would in turn increase the role that imitation could play in cognitive skill learning, thereby increasing a child's cognitive plasticity. Put another way, children can capitalize on a non-unique ability (generalized imitation) because they have greater representational resolution than do many other animals. The present framework thus assumes that frontal circuits contribute to children's greater representational resolution, but it allows for the possibility that comparable levels of resolution might be achieved even if these circuits are not present. Thus, a child without frontal lobes may still be able to learn a wide range of cognitive skills through imitation or other means quite well and may have an IQ comparable with that of children with frontal lobes.
Language as a Learning Tool
Language use requires practice but not specific perceptualmotor acts (e.g., sentences can be written, gestured, or spoken according to regional customs). It thus seems reasonable to describe language use as a cognitive skill. Toddlers are able to use language to solve problems related to predicting and controlling the behavior of others. In addition to serving communicative functions, language enables humans to reveal the contents of their minds, to others and to themselves. Language thus provides humans with unique ways of changing the contents of their minds (e.g., instructive learning, exposition, argumentation, deliberation, etc.; Carruthers, 2002; A. Clark, 1998) . In modern humans, many cognitive skills are dependent on language abilities, as are many psychometric tests designed to measure intelligence. This does not imply, however, that language is the linchpin of human intellectual capacities. Language appears to be just one of many factors that facilitates cognitive skill learning by humans, including imitation abilities, a long life span, and environmental (especially cultural) affordances (Premack, 2004) .
Learning to associate events, desires, and actions with words changes the problem-solving landscape by altering what is experienced. Language can augment memory (e.g., mnemonics facilitate recall) and simplify the environment. Language can also influence how events are perceived and how learning generalizes. For example, self-explanation facilitates generalization of problem solving by children (Brown & Kane, 1988; Crowley & Siegler, 1999) . Language thus can serve as a cognitive tool that facilitates knowledge acquisition and problem solving (A. Clark, 1998; Lieberman, 2000; Vicente & Martinez-Manrique, 2005) ; that is, language provides a catalyst for cognitive plasticity.
The idea that language is a tool that can enhance learning abilities is not a new one and is not limited to cognitive skill learning by humans. Premack, in his classic studies of artificial language learning by chimpanzees, reported that chimpanzees that mastered artificial languages were able to learn to perform conceptual tasks such as a relational matching that "uneducated" chimpanzees showed no ability to learn (Premack, 1983b) . It was later shown that artificial language learning per se was not the critical factor and that experience with symbol systems was sufficient to enhance learning capacity (R. K. Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997) . In a similar vein, Boysen and colleagues (Boysen, Bernston, Hannan, & Cacioppo, 1996) reported that chimpanzees that showed no ability to learn to choose the smaller of two different amounts of candy were able to learn this task when the candies were replaced with Arabic numerals. Findings such as these suggest that the availability of symbolic representations, such as those present within a language, can help an organism to overcome default modes of action (i.e., reconfigure cortical modules), thereby enhancing cognitive plasticity.
One way that both language and imitation abilities may augment cognitive plasticity in humans is by expanding the dimensions of stimulus representations. For example, speech supplements visual scenes with acoustic labels, which are in turn linked to (a) the motor programs used to produce speech; (b) visual representations of words; and (c) actions required to write those words. Consequently, seeing someone jump can activate representations across several modalities in parallel. Similarly, visual representations of scenes involving actions that can be imitated (like jumping) may be supplemented by the motor representations that would be required to copy the actions (Wilson, 2001; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005) . Increasing the dimensions of the input space can simplify learning by placing additional constraints on the problem space, particularly if a supplementary dimension provides a simpler (i.e., more resolvable) stimulus representation. Thus, linguistic and imitative capacities effectively expand the range of stimulus representations that an individual can bring to bear when attempting to solve a problem. The role of language in stimulus differentiation is most clearly evident during early language acquisition, as general use labels are gradually supplemented by more specific identifying words. In the present framework, it is this increased capacity to differentiate stimulus representations that increases cognitive plasticity in humans rather than any specialized imitation or language competence per se.
Conclusion
The present integrative framework holds that individuals with the highest cognitive plasticity are those that have the greatest number and diversity of cortical modules as well as the greatest capacity to dynamically retune and reconfigure those modules into interacting representational networks on the basis of ongoing events and past experiences. The explanation for why such individuals have greater cognitive plasticity is that cortical circuits can increase an organism's ability to resolve stimulus representations (including representations of actions and thoughts), affording additional opportunities for the organism to learn new solutions to problems. Several brain regions contribute to these processes. Basal forebrain neurons projecting throughout cortex can impact the number of cortical modules engaged in stimulus processing as well as the degree to which modules are customized during learning experiences. Prefrontal cortical networks may monitor activity in cortical modules and modulate basal forebrain activity, impacting the duration of neural activity in either region as well as interactions between cortical modules. The framework suggests that to predict differences in cognitive plasticity, both across species and across individuals within different species, it is critical that one has a clear understanding of the role that cortical networks play in cognitive skill learning. Without this, it may be impossible to predict with any precision how processing speed, or adaptability, or even specialized circuits will impact learning in a given species or individual. With a clearer understanding of how cortical processing constrains cognitive plasticity, the reasons why intelli-gence varies across individuals and species should become more transparent.
One can think of this explanatory framework as replacing the prevalent "brain-as-computer" metaphor with a comparably simple-minded simile: Cortex is like a set of tools. The subset of tools (cortical modules) relevant for building the representations required to perform a particular cognitive skill may change as construction progresses. The size, shape, precision, and availability of each tool impacts its usefulness. The availability of customized precision tools, in particular, may greatly facilitate construction. Species and individuals with more tools and a greater capacity to customize tools will be less constrained in terms of the representations that they can build. Development and experience initially increases an individual's set of tools, but as aging progresses, the likelihood that a tool is lost or broken increases. Of course, replacing one questionable trope with another is hardly progress. Ultimately, the capacity of this framework to generate new knowledge will determine its value.
Advances in psychometrics have transformed the way in which individual differences in human intelligence are conceptualized and analyzed, whereas the development of comparable methods for measuring intellectual capacities in other species has scarcely begun. Although new neuroimaging techniques provide powerful tools for correlating human capacities with brain structure and function, experiments that directly manipulate neural mechanisms to generate differences in cognitive plasticity are crucial for establishing how cortical function contributes to intellectual capacity. Results from such experiments can not only provide new perspectives on the evolutionary processes that determine cognitive plasticity but may also clarify the role that development and aging play and suggest new strategies for overcoming intellectual deficits and maximizing individual potential in humans and other animals. For example, if cognitive plasticity is constrained by a decreased number or diversity of cortical modules, as might happen after a stroke, then techniques for externally controlling neuromodulation (e.g., through localized stimulation or drug infusions) could provide a way of redistributing and customizing the available modules to compensate for this loss. Experiments investigating the relationship between neural plasticity and intellectual capacity may thus provide new insights into strategies for retaining or amplifying cognitive plasticity in patients with brain disease or damage.
Human intelligence studies and comparative research have taught us that identifying and measuring the intellectual capacities of different animals or individuals is a major empirical challenge with broad scope. Many of the difficulties associated with measuring and understanding variability in intelligence have arisen, at least in part, as a historical consequence of government-sponsored racial discrimination, and even genocide, in the name of eugenics. Research on the biological mechanisms of intelligence in the past has sparked heated debates regarding whether different groups vary in intelligence and whether efforts should be made to increase the average intelligence of the population (for a more detailed discussion, see Gray & Thompson, 2004; Mackintosh, 1986) . Although the present framework attempts to identify biological mechanisms that constrain intellectual capacity, it does not directly address how genetics impact those mechanisms. This framework also does not rank different species, individuals, age groups, or racial groups in terms of their superiority or suggest that some brains are inherently better than others. Rather, the current framework provides a unified approach to investigating how variations in neural circuits contribute to variations in cognitive plasticity, independent of the possible benefits and costs associated with such variability.
To the extent that intellectual capacity contributes to the mind, the contents of an organism's mind reflect its capacity to learn cognitive skills. Although the contents of different species' minds may vary considerably, humans and other animals face many similar challenges when attempting to learn cognitive skills, and the learning mechanisms that give rise to those contents appear to share many features. For example, cognitive skill learning invariably depends on repeated encounters with similar situations, the ability to rapidly recognize such similarities, and the capacity to select appropriate responses. Additionally, in all species that have been studied, opportunities and capacities for learning new skills increase during development, stabilize in adulthood, and then decrease during senescence. The debate between researchers who believe human intelligence is a unique outcome of specialized processors in the human brain and those who believe that the neural mechanisms mediating cognitive skills in humans are shared by other animals is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Nevertheless, it can hardly be questioned that gaining a clearer picture of how cortical networks function would increase our understanding of how individuals become able to perform intelligent acts. In this way, investigating the relationship between neural and cognitive plasticity in humans and other animals can provide new insights into how learning impacts intelligence, and how human minds arise.
